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This thesis analyzes the requirements of Israel and the
Palestinians in reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The author covers previous attempts at settlement,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1985 began with no sign that the dispute
between Israel and the Arabs was any nearer a settlement.
It has led to five wars in forty years and the 1982 Israeli
invasion of Lebanon has continued intermittently ever since.
Behind the fighting seems to lie the assumption on both sides
that the dispute can be resolved only by force. I argue that
there is no military solution to the Arab-Israel dispute.
Every approach to the crisis, in the Middle East and
in the outside world, reflects a military attitude, with the
result that the great variety of differences between the two
sides is ignored or obscured. The argument between the Arabs
and Israel has been reduced to military terms because each
side has lost patience with the other and resorted to force.
In setting out the historical background of attempted settle-
ments I show that there is much to talk about if Israeli and
Arab could contain their mutual impatience. After tracing
the origins of the dispute, I examine the requirements of
each major player and come to the conclusion that the latest
conflict could as well have given birth to negotiation as to
fighting.
In the last section I look to the future of Pales-
tine. I believe that the solution to each separate issue
between the two sides can come about only by a voluntary
acceptance of the situation by the local powers themselves
and not from the outside prompting, persuasion and periodical
intervention of the Super Powers.
II. TREATIES, DECLARATIONS AND COMMISSIONS
Palestine lies at the crossroads of three continents;
Europe, Asia and Africa. It is a holy land to three major
religions; Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Beginning in
1838 with the Anglo-Turkish Treaty to the 1983 Lebanon-Israel
Agreement on Troop Withdrawal there have been twenty-four
major written attempts to influence conditions in Palestine.
The problem between Israel and the Arabs is a politi-
cal one, with no military solution. In fact the Middle East
has had more opportunities than most other areas of the world
of discovering once and for all that disputes cannot be
solved simply by the clash of arms. The attempts to influ-
ence conditions in Palestine generally failed because their
scope of consideration was not broad enough. Each attempt
focused on their "piece of the pie" and neglected the affect
on the whole.
The attainment of a negotiated peace in the Middle
East demands, first and foremost, vigorous American leader-
ship in strict accordance with international law and in full
cooperation with the relevant international institutions.
The Arab-Israel dispute is more than a contest between oppos-
ing armies or even for that matter between opposing societies
with strong military orientation.
It is not specifically a product of racial incompati-
bility between Arab and Jew. The history of Jewish communi-
ties in the Arab world is not half so terrible as the history
of Jewish tribulations at the hand of Christian or Communist
European societies. It is fair to say that Jewish communities
have probably flourished culturally and commercially with
considerably more security in the Arab world over the last
twenty centuries than they have in Europe.
It is therefore more a geopolitical than a social
problem, because the friction exists between states as power
bodies, not as representatives of different races. The fric-
tion does not stem from the existence of an Arab-Jewish
incompatibility. The solution to the Arab-Israel problem
therefore does not lie in the solution to the problem of
world Jewry, but more in a local regional equilibrium between
the states in the Middle East, of which Israel is one.
In attempting to work out a negotiated settlement it
is important to remember that both sides are so absolutely
convinced of the justice of their case that the moral view
depends upon from which side you look at it. There would be
little point, therefore, in making a moral judgement or seek-
ing to award blame for any particular condition to either
side. There have been so many stones thrown, neither side
can remember who threw the first stone. So it is imperative
that the United States be the strong arbitrator.
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Is the United States presently in a position to be a
fair and effective arbitrator? As a party to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, the U.S. government has an affirmative
obligation under common article 1 to respect and to ensure
respect for their observance in all circumstances by other
contracting powers, such as Israel. This obligation became
irresistibly compelling in a situation where Israel was
enabled to invade Lebanon by means of weapons, munitions, and
supplies provided by the U.S. government.
Under these and numerous other circumstances of com-
plicity, the Reagan Administration had an absolute duty to
employ the tremendous leverage of military and economic aid
to secure from Israel and its local allies strict obedience
to the humanitarian laws of armed conflict as well as to
obtain Israel's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from
Lebanon as required by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 508
(1982) and 509 (1982) , both of which were legally binding on
Israel and the United States under Chapter article 25. Yet
the Reagan Administration willfully refused to perform even
these most elementary obligations.
The basic principle of international law and politics
dictating non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another
state indicated quite clearly that the Reagan Administration
should have refrained from taking sides. If the U.S. goal is
a peaceful settlement, we must arbitrate from a position of
11
credibility, gained by evenhandedness and a profound sense
of fair play toward all participants in the dispute.
In order to get other countries to respect interna-
tional law the United States must lead the way in respecting
those laws and not be unduly influenced by any special inter-
est group. In today's environment we must recognize that the
foreign and domestic policies of Lebanon have to be deter-
mined by the Lebanese people themselves without interference
or compulsion from any external source.
The self-determination of peoples has been a funda-
mental principle of American foreign policy and of interna-
tional law and politics since President Woodrow Wilson's
famous Fourteen Points Address of January 8, 1918. [Ref. 1:
pp. 464-72] There will be no peace in the Middle East until
the Palestinian people are given the opportunity to exercise
their international legal right of self-determination in
whatever manner they choose, not in accordance with a limited
set of alternatives preselected for them by the United States
in collusion with Israel, Egypt, or Jordan. Recognition of
this fact is the keystone of any Middle East policy.
Despite the Camp David Accords, neither Egypt, Israel,
the United States nor Jordan has any right under international
law to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. [Ref. 2
pp. 9-10] Both the U.N. General Assembly and the League of
Arab States recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian
12
people, a fact that must be respected by Israel and the United
States [Ref . 3 : pp. 18-21] Mutual and simultaneous recogni-
tion by Israel and the PLO of their respective rights under
international law must be the next stage in the development
of the Middle East peace process.
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III. WATERS OF THE JORDAN AND LITANI RIVERS
Jordan water has perhaps been the real reason behind
past Israeli aggression. The four countries of Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon and Israel share the River Jordan. It rises in one,
its main tributary is in another, and the third possesses
many miles of its banks. The main lake, Lake Tiberias,
through which the Jordan flows is bordered by Israel and
Syria, though effective control of the lake's outlet belongs
to Israel.
From source to end its total length is about seventy
miles, more than two-thirds of which are below sea level.
Its two main sources are at Dan and Banias and unite below
sea level just inside Israel. From there it drops 680 feet
in the next nine miles into a delta which opens into the Sea
of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) . South of the Sea of Galilee the
river receives its main tributary, the Yarmuk, which flows in
from the east, and various other salt springs rise in the
valley as it descends to the Dead Sea, 1,300 feet below sea
level.
In the past there was little settlement actually
within the Jordan Valley itself, with the exception the Jor-
dan's water is not vital for the farmers on the high ground
at either side of the Rift Valley, which has a reasonable
rainfall. But it could be important either in the immediate
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area of the river, which before the influx of refugees had
been populated permanently, or elsewhere in the countries
which border on the river. This point really lies at the
root of the problem of the Jordan River.
The exodus of refugees from Israel-conquered terri-
tory in old Palestine meant that for the first time there was
a settled population in the Jordan Valley. That is where
they came to rest, and if the area had not been settled much
in the past, because other places were preferable, the short-
age of alternative choices to the refugees meant that they
had to make do with what came their way. The area provided
an uncomfortable, though not -irretrievable prospect, but
their only hope of making it at all palatable was to irrigate
the potentially fertile valley and cultivate it, so that they
could alleviate their economic distress and make it a more
amenable environment in which to live. This meant they
required Jordan's water for that area.
Israel, on the other hand, also had a problem of a
new settlement in potentially barren country. The influx of
new Jewish immigrants could only be borne by the settlement
in areas not formerly populated, or cultivated, and the Jew-
ish reclamation of desert areas was a formidable achievement,
showing an application for husbandry which possibly startled
the immigrants themselves, mostly coming as they did from
urban communities in Europe. But for this work they needed
as much water as the Arabs. There was obviously not enough
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water for all these extra projects, however, particularly
when one added the existing areas which had always relied on
water from the Jordan in the first place.
This problem was no doubt exaggerated by the fact
that it was not just an isolated scrap over who needed most
water. The reasons for wanting the water were a highly
inflammable political issue on their own, directly involving
the question of Arab refugees on the one hand and the Jewish
immigration into Israel on the other. Thus they tended to
treat the question as a political issue, whereas without
those overtones the littoral powers could, or should the coun-
tries at the higher end of the river, who obviously have more
power over the water supply even if they have less water, be
obliged to honour the needs of the other littoral states fur-
ther downstream?
The question running through the Jordan waters argu-
ment between the Arabs and Israel has centered on the right
of Israel to divert Jordan water for use outside the immediate
Jordan area, and conversely the right of the source countries
to retaliate by denying Israel any water, or more than a very
little, by a diversion of the mainstream to keep its early
passage out of Israeli territory. There are many who have
assumed that the only solution will come when water is no
longer at such a premium in the area, and when desalination
and other sources of power have managed to defuse the problem
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of water for an equitable distribution of the Jordan to be
arranged.
By 1956, Israel and Jordan were ready to sign an agree-
ment. This stipulated Jordan's primary right to the water,
but underlined also Israel's insistence on her right to convey
the water to any site chosen in Israel, and not necessarily
ones in the catchment area. Agreement was never reached,
because of the political explosions and war of 1956. Because
of the 19 56 war destroying the work toward an agreement, the
Israelis were able to complete a scheme for diverting surplus
Jordan water from the Huleh marshes, in northern Israel,
across Galilee by pipeline to irrigate their new settlement
areas in the northern part of the Negev Desert.
In the early 1960's Israel wanted more water. She
wanted control of the headwaters of the Jordan, the Hasbani
and the Banias, both located in the Golan Heights. She was
also taking more water from Lake Tiberias and resented Syria
bordering part of the Lake. This author feels the "headwaters"
issue was the prime reason Israel initiated the 1967 war. In
that campaign, Israel captured all the key points that might
figure into a future water dispute.
As long as Israel remains in occupation of the present
territory she conquered in the 1967 war, there is no water
problem of Jordan waters, because neither Jordan nor Syria has
control over any of the areas necessary to reinforce their
good argument for a share of the water. For Israel, this is
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a potent argument for remaining in the occupied territories
and it was the main reason for annexing the Golan Heights.
In 19 78 the Israeli Army went into South Lebanon. They
took their surveyors and water scientists with them. Their
objective, which they reached, was the Litani River. They
later withdrew. Then in 19 8 2 they invaded again and went to
the Litani and beyond. This time they stayed. They have not
pulled back below the Litani. Why? The reason they invaded
was because their ambassador in London was wounded; the reason
they stayed was water.
When I left Israel in July of 1983 the Israelis were
building permanent concrete implacements along the Litani.
I believe that Israel is in the process of building a military-
civilian government for Israeli occupied Lebanon. The same
pattern of Israeli infiltration that has been seen in the
West Bank territories seems to be evolving in Lebanon. The
ultra nationalist extremist group, Gush Emunim," is planning to
put Israeli settlements in southern Lebanon.
If Prime Minister Peres follows Mr. Begin 's past action,
he will not denounce these settlements for fear of criticism
from hardline Israeli factions that are the bedrock of his
political support. Instead he will see that the bootleg
settlements are hooked up to electricity and water. This
water will come from the Litani 1 Water has and will continue
to be a major factor in Israeli actions, manipulations and
negotiations.
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On August 14, 1984, the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz
reported that Tahal, the Israeli water planning authority, had
devised a means for diverting Hasbani water to Israel via the
defunct tapline oil pipeline which once transported oil from
Saudi Arabic to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon [Ref. 4]. After
Israeli forces occupied Syria's Golan Heights in 1967, all
but the Saudi-Jordanian leg of the pipeline ceased to function.
The basic Israeli scheme consists of a series of channels,
aquaducts, siphons and tunnels which would divert and carry
Litani waters from southern Lebanon into Israel for distribution
via the National Water Carrier. Additionally, Israel has
buried pipes in the area of Marjayoun.
These pipes are probably being used to syphon underground
water from an aquifer fed by seepage from the Litani and
Hasbani Rivers and by underground streams from Mt. Hermonv.
[Ref. 5:p. 23]
Israeli demands for water continue to exceed supply.
Israel now faces a serious water shortage, aggravated by its
intensification of agriculture in the Negev and its settlement
policy in both the West Bank and Israel itself. The country's
water deficit will likely reach 450 mem by the end of 1985,
and there are no new unexploited water resources within Israel
itself to alleviate this shortage. [Ref. 6]
Israeli water policy continues to blatantly contradict
all commonly accepted international standards. If past history
is any guide, little hope remains that the Lebanese might
19
regain control over their southern water resources. Until the
reality of Israeli water policy is addressed by U.S. policy-
makers in the context of a negotiated settlement, efforts to
further peace in this troubled region will remain an exercise
in futility.
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IV. ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR SETTLEMENT
Jews have always lived among the mainly Arab Muslim
population of Palestine. But in the 1880' s a new type of Jew-
ish immigration began, mainly from Eastern Europe, inspired
by the Zionist ideal of a Jewish national home; this soon
aroused the hostility of Ottoman officials and part of the
population.
This hostility sprang from the attempt to implant a
new society in a land already occupied by an old one. When
the settlers came they found a complete society already there:
farmers, craftsmen and merchants, ancient towns and villages,
religious institutions, a culture expressed in Arabic, a
leadership which formed part of the Arab Ottoman elite.
The new Jewish society, by the nature of the Zionist
ideal, was to be a complete and exclusive one. Its aim was
to create a wholly Jewish economy: land bought by the Jewish
National Fund became the inalienable property of the Jewish
people and no non-Jew could ever be employed on it. As num-
bers grew, the idea of a Jewish national home turned into
that of a Jewish State. This bad situation grew worse and in
1948 there happened what the Arabs had feared for so long
and with it, War.
All wars create refugees, but after the armistice
agreement of 1949 Israel refused to allow the Arab refugees
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to return. By refusing to consider the refugee problem except
in the framework of a peace settlement with the surrounding
Arab States, they linked together two matters which had no
moral connection; for the return of the refugees was an obli-
gation which they owed not to the surrounding Arab States but
to the Palestinian Arabs themselves, as inhabitants of the
land they had conquered. To make such a connection was the
more tempting because Israel did not really wish the refugees
to return; for what it wanted was to have the land without its
inhabitants, so as to settle its own immigrants. This was
Israel's stand forty years ago and it continues through today.
It is the very essence of Israel's problems.
What does Israel want in a settlement? They want to
keep the land, all of it. The Israelis know that to keep the
land they must not go to a settlement and they do everything
they can to keep from being compelled by international insti-
tutions to participate in settlement talks.
The key issue being debated in Israel today is what
to do about the West Bank and Gaza and the people who live
there. Israel does not like any of her options:
- Withdrawal as specified in U.N. Resolution 242 and as envi-
sioned in the Camp David accords, including self-determination
for the Palestinians at least to the extent of full autonomy
in the territories under some kind of confederation with
Jordan.
- A forcible annexation of the area and its legal absorption
into Israel, which would give large numbers of non-Jewish
citizens the right to vote and live as equals under the law.
Any official action to take the occupied territories would
directly violate the Camp David accords, on which the
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Egyptians consider the peace treaty to be based, and at the
same time would result in the establishment of a dual or
binational society, with the two million Palestinians com-
prising 40 percent of its inhabitants and destined to grow
to 50 percent by the end of this century—whether or not
they are granted the basic rights of citizenship. In either
case, Israel would likely be further isolated and condemned
by the international community, with no remaining chance to
end hostilities with any appreciable part of the Arab world.
- Continuing military occupation of the Palestinian land with
possible legal absorption after the Arab population has
been substantially reduced by emigration. With or without
legal annexation, full citizenship would not be granted to
the Palestinians. Many believe that this is the basic
policy followed by the Likud government. Its opponents in
Israel deride the racist connotation of prescribing perma-
nent second-class status for the Palestinians.
- Some form of shared sovereignty, perhaps with Jordan, or a
division of the land into small communities, with equal
rights for all those dwelling in the area. This would
involve either granting independence to the Palestinians or
giving equal authority to Jews and Arabs in small locations
scattered throughout the occupied territories. Administra-
tion would be very, but not impossible if Israelis, Jordani-
ans, and Palestinians ever decide to cooperate.
- Granting genuine autonomy and the right of self-determination
to the Palestinians within most of the West Bank and Gaza
areas, provided substantial demilitarization of the area
occurs and there are adequate guarantees that Israel's and
Jordan's security will not be threatened [Ref. 7 : pp. 48-49].
The Israelis are hoping it's true that possession is
nine-tenths of the law. It is supporting this theory by con-
tinuing to build more settlements on the West Bank. Before
they were building on vacant hilltops but now they're build-
ing in the center of Hebron. They have the military might to
suppress any opposition.
In Israel there is broad agreement among nearly all
political parties that there can be no total withdrawal to
the pre-June 1967 borders and no negotiating with the PLO.
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Even if the PLO were to modify its charter to recognize Israel
and to renounce terrorism, much of the Likud, the opposition
Labor Party, and the National Religions Party, Israel's three
major political combinations, would still oppose negotiations
with the PLO out of concern they would lead inevitably to
establishment of a revanchist Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
Another hot point of contention in any settlement
talks is compensation for refugees. Israeli Jews have
received millions of dollars in compensation from Germany.
However, most Israeli parties adamantly reject any compensa-
tion for those Palestinians who fled in the 1948 and 1967
wars. Both Labor and Likud parties would probably agree to
the return of a limited number of refugees to the West Bank
and Gaza as part of a final Peace agreement. The Israelis
have stated the present status of Jerusalem is not open for
negotiation. An overwhelming percentage of Israelis reject
sharing sovereignty over the city with the Arabs.
Today in Israel we see the Peres government's pre-
occupations with Lebanon and with Israel's economic crisis
and its tenuous hold on political power discourage it from
addressing directly the divisive issue of territorial compro-
mise on the West Bank. The Labor party recognizes that peace
is impossible unless Israel displays flexibility on sover-
eignty. Labor envisages returning to Jordan approximately
60 percent of the West Bank and Gaza as part of a peace
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agreement Amman, in any negotiated settlement, Israel
requires that its sovereignty extend to all the remaining
areas:
- The Jordan River valley, including the areas northwest
of the Dead Sea and the western approaches to the
valley-.
- East Jerusalem and its environs, as annexed by Israel
after the 1967 war.
- The Etzion bloc of settlements between Jerusalem and
Hebron.
- Certain areas along the western edge of the West Bank,
including the Latrun salient, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm.
- Southern Gaza abutting the Sinai.
Labor leaders believe these provisions would return to Jor-
danian control approximately 85 percent of the Arab inhabi-
tants of the occupied territories. Labor and Likud leaders
do not see much room for compromise with Syria on the Golan
Heights.
Israel's national unity government has taken no offi-
cial position on any existing peace plan. Certain provisions
of existing peace plans have aroused specific Israeli objec-
tions. Israelis oppose, for example, provisions contained in
the Fez and Soviet proposals calling for an international
peace conference and the creation of an independent Pales-
tinian state. They oppose an international peace conference
because they believe the participation of the PLO and Soviet
Union would dilute the U.S. role in protecting Israeli
interests.
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Labor and Likud differ over the Reagan initiative of
September 1982. Likud adamantly rejects the proposal as a
deviation from the Camp David Accords. Labor disagrees with
some aspects of the proposals, such as those dealing with
Jerusalem, but most Labor Party leaders regard the plan as
consistent with the party's negotiation strategy based on
Resolution 242.
In today's environment, I believe the only possible
settlement is to have the West Bank demilitarized and a United
Nations Force set up on the West Bank. The goal here is to
first get the Israeli occupation troops out. Then with the
cessation of guerrilla acts, a return of the refugees could
begin. The Palestinians would then be able to seek the basic
human rights of freedom of expression, equal treatment under
the law, an end to military rule and the right of self deter-
mination. After a few years of peaceful coexistence with
Israel they could become a Palestinian state, with the backing
of the international community.
Yasir Arafat said in 1974, "We are ready to establish
our independent state in any part from which Israel will with
draw." Chairman Arafat must control his radical elements for
the proposed settlement to work. The key here is to prove to
the world that the security of Israel would not be threatened.
In all probability the Peace Now movement in Israel would
support a settlement that guarantees Peace and the security
of Israel.
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Chairman Arafat and his executives would have to deal
with the problem that most PLO members have no intention of
recognizing Israel's right to exist unless it is willing to
grant equal rights to the Palestinians and they insist that
all U.N. resolutions dealing with the Middle East, many of
which are highly favorable to the Palestinian cause, must be
accepted by the Israelis if the Palestinians are to embrace
Resolutions 242 and 338.
Therefore the United States must arbitrate and pressure
both sides to come to a settlement. The U.S. has the power
and the moral responsibility to do so. It may require the
U.S. to withhold aid, to bring Israel to the bargaining table.
The United States must remember that Israel could have peace
tomorrow but she doesn't want to share the land. She continues
to take, to reach for "Biblical" Israel. If not stopped soon,
Israel will have gone beyond the point of no return and the
Palestinian refugees will never be able to return to their
homeland, a land that they have tilled for centuries. They
must return; it is their birthright.
The PLO should recognize Israel now, then Israel would
have to act in response. A genuine move by the PLO towards
peace might bring rich dividends by arousing support in the
United States and other nations. There are many Israelis who
believe that the Palestinians deserve a homeland and that
their basic rights, including the right of self-determination
should be honored. The fate of four million Palestinians
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depends on whether the PLO chooses to pursue its goals by
peaceful means or by continued bloodshed.
Israel claims to be a democracy but it is not. Israel
is a racist state for if you are not a Jew you are not welcome
to live there and indeed by law you can not. Nevertheless,
her government is democratically elected and the ability of
that government to trample on the carefully cultured instincts
of the people of Israel is therefore very circumscribed. We
know, in the main, what those instincts are. They are to keep
Israel a strong independent and Jewish state. The concessions
involved would amount to about the limit of Israel tolerance.
Israel must heed the lessons learned from the failure of
the May 17, 1983 Agreement on Troop Withdraw. [Ref. 8] Hailed
by the Begin government as an Israeli-Lebanese "peace treaty"
it was procured by the one-sided negotiations that were imposed
upon President Gemayd by Israel and brokened by U.S. diplomats.
Because it was procured by means of the threat and use of force
in violation of the most basic principles of international law,
it was void "abinitio" under article 52 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. [Ref. 9]
As a direct result of the Israeli invasion, over 20,000
people were killed in Lebanon, including almost 650 Israeli
soldiers and 300 American servicemen and diplomats, all of
whom needlessly lost their lives. [Ref. 10:pp. 3, 16-18]
The United States has a moral obligation to bring about a
negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict to prevent
future crimes against humanity.
28
V. PALESTINIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR SETTLEMENT
Palestinian nationalism started by opposing the British
military presence. There was no link between this opposition
and the later antagonism towards Zionism other than the link
between suspected British imperialism, sharpened when the
implications of the Balfour Declaration came to suggest
Jewish statehood rather than merely a Jewish community.
[Ref. ll:p. 3] By 1935, the annual immigration of Jews into
Palestine reached over 61,000 causing great unrest among the
Palestinians. [Ref. 12:p. 44] This went further when Britain
appeared reluctant to grant Palestine independence, like Iraq,
and Egypt, which had their independence granted during the
1930' s and subsequently also Trans Jordan in 1946. "Why not
Palestine?" asked the Palestinians. Why not grant Palestine
independence, and in that case insure that the part in the
Balfour Declaration about the interests of the local population
was itself assured by the existence of a Palestinian regime
in Palestine?
The Palestinians were peasants until 1948, then became
refugees and re-emerged after 1967 as militants and revo-
lutionaries. Before 1948, the Palestinians lived full lives
despite backwardness and poverty. Then a vibrant and complex
village society was destroyed as the land, carefully tended
for countless generations, was "miraculously" cleared. Of
29
the four million Palestinians scattered throughout many nations,
more than half now live under Israeli administration. Also
there is a large Palestinian population in Southern Lebanon,
which is occupied by Israeli forces.
Between 1948 and 1964 thousands of Palestinians were
corralled in destitution. In 1964 the Palestinians realized
that lack of any response to their plight would keep them
confined to isolated refugee camps and they would become
political pawns for other Arab states. In June 1964, the
Palestine Liberation Organization was formally organized,
with its own military force, to represent the Palestinian
people. [Ref. 13:p. 50]
There are three basic views about a possible reconciliation
between the Jews and the Palestinians. One is that the
Palestinian question is the core of Arab-Israeli hostility,
and with some form of parity and self-determination for the
Palestinians, the conflict will begin to evaporate as the
Arab world accepts Israel's political reality. Another view
is that following a solution to the broader Arab-Israeli
dispute, including the unequivocal acceptance of Israel's
existence by a major portion of the Arab world, the Pales-
tinian element of the conflict will be more easily solved.
The gloomiest, most pessimistic view is expressed by those
who say that no permanent peace can come to the Middle East
so long as a Jewish state exists in the heartland of an Arab
world, or on the other hand, that granting any element of
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self-determination to the Palestinians will inevitably be the
first step toward the destruction of Israel. In 1974, the
United Nations General Assembly declared the PLO to be
recognized as the legitimate and sole representative of
Palestinian people. [Ref. 14:p. 295-296]
The PLO has become widely recognized by foreign governments.
They are elated over the many U.N. resolutions supporting
Palestinians and highly favor Resolutions 242 and 338. They
feel, without a doubt, that the non-resolution of the
Palestinian problem has been the direct and indirect cause of
all the Arab-Israeli wars. They feel "land accumulation" is
behind Israel's refusal to negotiate on the basis of Resolution
242. Especially since they claim Israel's right to exist was
stated to the world in the Fez statement of 1982.
Former President Carter feels the realities are:
The Palestinian issue is a basic cause of the continuing
Middle East conflict, and it must be addressed successfully
if there is ever to be peace in the region.
The PLO, with Yasir Arafat as its elected leader, is
the entity responsible for the political future of the
Palestinians and for negotiations to secure their rights;
no one else can assume these functions without specific
authorization from the PLO.
In order to find peace with justice in the Middle East,
the United States must play a major role, but, in honoring
a commitment made to Israel in 1975, American officials are
pledged not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it
recognizes Israel's right to exist and acknowledges the
applicability of U.N. Resolution 242 in resolving the
differences in the Middle East.
The PLO sees U.N. Resolution 242 as seriously defective
because its only passing reference to the Palestinians is
the word "refugees," while many other resolutions of the
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U.N. cover the issue much more definitively and are not
supported by Israel. Furthermore, to recognize Israel in
a unilateral and unreciprocated act would be playing a
major political card that would be. needed in future
negotiations to bargain for their own fate [Ref. 7: pp. 126-127]
The PLO has lost much of its Egyptian support since Camp
David and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. It now seems to
be pursuing these basic goals:
- Independent authority free from domination by any single
Arab power.
- Cohesion within the organization.
- Acceptance as the sole representative of the Palestinian
people.
- The maintenance of an uncompromising commitment to liberate
as much of Palestine as possible.
- No clear recognition of Israel's right to exist.
- The re-establishment of Arab unity, which involves bringing
Egypt back into the Arab fold.
- Increasing support from other peoples for the PLO and its
members.
In 1969, Yashir Arafat ammended certain provisions of
the Palestine National Charter of 1964. Article 6 of the 1969
Charter considered Jews, who resided in Palestine before 1948,
as Palestinians. However, no new reference was made which
would allow for a Jewish return into Palestine after its
liberation as had existed in the earlier Charter. [Ref. 4: p. 27]
The PLO must accept the realization that the state of
Israel is here to stay. If they would clearly recognize
Israel, world opinion would swing in their favor and Israel
would have to respond with the eyes of the world on her.
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VI. A NEW PEACE INITIATIVE AND THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE
In the late 1940s, the American government helped an
oppressed people (the Jews) oppress another people (the
Palestines) . The creation of Israel actually gave rise to
the problem of an Arab displacement almost as large as the
Jewish displacement the whole thing was expected to solve.
Political activity over the Middle East has concentrated
mainly on the United Nations, in spite of the Israelis deter-
mination to bring Arab nations to a direct face-to-face
negotiation with themselves. The United Nations' efforts
culminated in a British-sponsored resolution in November
1967 which received the unanimous approval of the Security
Council. It called for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces
from occupied territories; an end to the state of belliger-
ence between the parties; respect for the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of all states in the area; freedom for
navigation through international waterways; a just settlement
of the refugee problem; and the establishment of demilitarized
zones
.
The political situation has been mostly concerned with
attempts by outside powers to persuade the Middle Eastern
nations involved in the dispute to agree to some basis for
negotiation towards a settlement.
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There was an almost continuous series of other efforts
either on a two-power basis between Russia and the United
States or occasionally on a four-power basis which included
France and Great Britain. These attempts foundered not only
on the impossibility of persuading either an Arab Government
or an Israeli Government to make the first move—withdrawal
by Israel or comprehensive recognition of Israel by the Arabs-
but also on the fundamentally opposite conceptions of settle-
ment which the two sides brought to the question.
In April 1968, President Nasser announced his support for
the Palestinian guerrillas while Israel based her policy of
reprisals on the contention that Arab leaders
—
particularly
King Hussein—could discipline the Palestinian guerrillas if
they wanted to.
American peace plans have gradually moved toward Arab
desires and consequently provoke predictably unwelcome
responses from Israel. Many formulae have been put forward
either by the Soviet Union or the United States, but such
initiatives seem to make no difference to the situation on
the ground. Israel's continuing ability to hold on to the.
occupied territories and to do so until Israel feels the
Arabs are prepared to come forward and negotiate with them
alone, is a major obstacle to the peace process.
In the background to this political situation, the
Palestinian movement has emerged as a gradual increasing
threat to the chances of settlement being reached between
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Israel and the Arab governments. The political implications
of the growth of a separate Palestinian movement are realized
more by the Israelis than by other Arab governments. The
emergence of a strong and coordinated Palestinian element in
the situation has made it less likely that either Amman or
Cairo will have the power or authority to sign a treaty which
would also bind the Palestinians. This is caused by the
increased physical and military independence which has been
shown by the Palestinians.
The psychological impact of the Palestinian movement had
the effect of projecting the whole argument on to a new
basis—no longer in terms of. a straight Israel/Egyptian or
Israel/Jordanian contest, but more in terms of some solution
to the problem of Palestine, Which involves something more
than the relationships between these states. It has renewed
emphasis on Palestine which is unwelcome to the Israelis,
whose spokesmen largely ignore the Palestinian element by
continuing to insist on direct government-to-government
negotiations with other Arab nations.
In this context, I believe that progress towards a
settlement is in fact bedevilled by the terms in which it
is discussed. I would go further and say that any settlement
along the lines currently being put forward will be arti-
ficially concluded and will not in the long term cure the
endemic nature of conflict in the area. This is because a
settlement along the present lines is based on the supposed
necessity to guarantee Israel's security.
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Today Israel is the fourth strongest military power in
the world and is stronger than any combination of Arab states.
So Israel's military security should not be seriously at
issue. If any agreements were to be reached simply on the
basis of a physical guarantee for Israel, they would overlook
all the other fundamental differences which continue to exist
between the two sides.
If Israel's basic security were the only necessary
ingredient to a solution, then a formula could possibly be
found whereby the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the
Jordan could be demilitarized. Israel would then be insulated
on every frontier from the unwelcome attention of her Arab
neighbors, and could hardly ask for more.
The military security of a nation which has shown that
she can—even without international guarantees or assistance--
completely dominate her neighbors should not be allowed to
occupy our minds to the exclusion of the other issues in the
dispute. Any settlement which was based merely on the
achievement of such a guarantee would simply be a reversion
to a political situation being similar to that which existed
before 1967. An opportunity to make a really radical attempt
to solve some of the points of contention would have solved
nothing except Israel's territorial military security.
Yet, even that formula would be incomplete in the sense
that it would be forced to ignore the unchangeable facts of
geography and the jet age. Supersonic aircraft tend to put
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business of frontier security and frontier agreements into
rather a false perspective. No formal guarantee could alter
the fact that the cities of Israel and most of her Arab
neighbours are only a few minutes away from each other as the
modern bomber flies. So an agreement which simply attended
to Israel's frontier security would signify a positive
decision to solve only what Israel considered to be the most
important part of the situation, while ignoring the other
indivisible parts of the dispute.
A solution to the refugee problem is essential not only
because of their plight, but because without it one would
avoid any final determination of the position which Israel
will occupy within the Arab world. It is the nature of that
position which at present contains the elements of combustion.
It is the nature of Israel's position as an outpost, or as
something apart from rather than in and of the world immediately
around her, which seems to arouse such animosities in the
Middle East.
It is not only that the Israelis are a highly technical
people; it is not only that they have achieved such agri-
cultural success, visibly presented by the pleasing spectacle
of forests rising on the formerly eroded hills west of
Jerusalem, and the neat pattern of reclamation in the desert.
It is also their great culture which has, after all, enriched
European life during the centuries of the Jewish dispersion
and which now, concentrated in a national context, is all the
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more impressive. It is the fusion of many Jewish sub-cultures
brought in from the various communities both in and outside
Europe which give a kind of kaleidoscopic aspect to a society
which yet remains so obviously united. It is, perhaps above
all, the fascinating achievement of the language of Hebrew,
undeniably Israel's national language and now the first
language of her citizens, although most of them were probably
brought up and educated in some other language.
All these things seem to emphasize the stark contrast
between modern Israel and the Arabs, and which conditions
many Western minds into believing that any nation which
possesses such characteristics— so obviously superior to its
neighbors—cannot very well be in the wrong. But though
there is no moral issue about this, I believe that nations
as a whole have to accept that their behavior cannot be
totally isolated from their neighbors. A nation has a choice
either to adjust itself to the general pattern of the regional
community to which it belongs, or else to accept the con-
sequences, one of which might be expulsion or ostracism from
that community, while another might be the subjugation of the
community by the so-called "outsider" who would then force
the other members to adjust themselves to it.
Without an adjustment of some kind, however, there will
be no natural balance and instead there is likely to be the
kind of regional tension, one way or the other, which exists
between Israel and the Arab states even before one starts
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looking for specific issues which divide them. It exists
because Israel is strong, Westernized, co-ordinated, volubly
political and yet united, in an area where the Arabs are
seldom these things, and instinctively resent the presence
among them of one who is so different.
Israel has never acknowledged the principle of allowing
the return of any of the Palestinians. Although the
implementation of any such principle would be hard, nobody
believes that, in practice, it would have to extend very far.
But it is the principle of exclusiveness which Israel practices
to a greater extent than any other nation today—with the
possible exception of South Africa—which certainly acts as
one of the major irritants in the Middle East. Israel was
founded as a Jewish state, and its laws and customs are
essentially Jewish. The Balfour Declaration provided for a
Jewish community, and the U.N. partition agreement provided
for two half countries representing the Jewish and Arab
communities, joined in an economic union. But Israelis say
that only through statehood can the Jewish community be
certain of guaranteeing their existence, and that nothing
else could be "secured in public law." Therefore, they see
any erosion of that statehood, such as might come about by
an ethnic trend which eventually would lead to the Jews being
a minority, as a threat to their community as a whole and so
to their ultimate existence. The Israelis argue that as Jews
they have been a minority group long enough, and they are
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now determined to remain a majority, even if it means keeping
out the real majority by force.
One would indeed find many quarters in Israel who would
argue that there was no point in retreating at all from the
present position. They would argue that the Arabs by their
aggression asked for all that they received, and that if
Israel can now maintain her position why should she not do so.
But generally speaking, I think we can take it that any
solution which fitted in with the instincts of the Israeli
people would be inadequate in terms of political satisfaction
to the Arabs. They might be forced to accept it, but unwilling
acceptance of a situation under duress is something with which
the Arabs have been quite familiar during the last sixty years
of Palestine's history, and there is no sign yet that they
are ready to bow to force majeure .
Israel appears to be hoping for a change of heart, but I
believe that such a change of heart will not, indeed cannot,
come until there is a change in the internal policy identity
of Israel itself. The difficulty lies in the fact that any
such change within Israel would have to be an involuntary one,
because it would totally undermine the present principle of
a Zionist state.
It must first be made clear that the world can neither
ask nor expect the government voluntarily to commit suicide
by agreeing to any settlement which flouted the principles
on which the state is based. Whatever one may think of these
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principles, and however responsible for the present state of
affairs one may consider them, they are nevertheless securely
based in law, and upheld by an elected and internationally
recognized government. Moreover, the Israeli government with
the nation behind it at present has the power to insist on
the retention of those exclusive features of their society
even if they attract the hostility of peoples around them.
Israel has shown that, in the final analysis, she is
powerful enough to neutralize that hostility. The Arabs are
thinking along totally different lines, but there is nothing
the Arabs can do. Israeli power cannot be successfully chal-
lenged now, and I doubt whether it could be in the foreseeable
future, no matter what new equipment is delivered to the
Arabs. So long as Israel retains first of all the ability
to hit back—and that will always be guaranteed to her by the
United States to balance off any Soviet arms deliveries to
the Arabs—and secondly her possession of her present frontiers,
she can present her neighbors with a very real threat of
invasion leading to their collapse, if they overdo their
hostility to her.
How can this difficulty be resolved? How could the
people of Israel, so wary of change, and so ready to rule
out as unacceptable any development which undermines their
Zionists 1 principles, nevertheless be induced to accept a
new situation in Palestine which does not merit the hostility
of the Arabs? Does the world have to face the prospect of
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enduring another long period of strife and frustration in the
Middle East before a settlement could be achieved? We have
already endured three generations, and it may well be that
now there is much chance of the dispute being satisfactorily
settled. Is there any way it could be settled other than the
Arabs eventually overrunning Israel and causing a dispersion
comparable to the original dispersion when Jerusalem was
sacked? I regard that prospect as inconceivable with more
than three and a half million Jews now in Israel. On the
other hand, I do not believe any solution to the problem is
possible without a much closer relationship between the two
races within in it than is contemplated today.
That may sound heresay to the Zionists and propagators of
a purely theoretic state in Israel. It may sound inconceivable
to those who say that under no condition can the two races
come closer, whose experience of Palestine under the Mandate,
or the West Bank since the 1967 occupation, has convinced
them that Jewish and Arab communities can only work together
if there is some higher authority over them to see that they
do.
The success of such an arrangement might hinge on the
question whether or not the dynamism of the Israelis could
first of all exist without that particular extra stimulus
which it has received from nationhood, and if that was
possible, then secondly whether it could do so without
inspiring the defensive hostility of those Arabs who, though
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not part of it, nevertheless would be closely enough involved
to feel uncomfortable about its force.
There seems to be no reason why all the impressive
elements in Israel should be lost if that country became part
of a Middle Eastern state— a binational state—or even an
Arab state with a large Jewish minority within it. Over a
period of a generation or two, the ethnic developments suggest
that the Oriental Jews and the Arabs together will outnumber
the Jews from Europe. It is inconceivable that the nature of
Israel would not change to reflect that trend. Hitherto the
Jews have been able to keep the Arabs out, but it would be a
different matter to hold them down.
It is in this context that the emergence of the
Palestinian movement is of such significance. Its full
dimensions may be exaggerated, but it is certainly of a
dimension which will make it extremely hard for Arab govern-
ments to come to an agreement with Israel which ignored the
Palestinian claims. Even if the provisions of such a settle-
ment with Israel could be possible, it presupposes the
resubmersion of the Palestinian identity into the general
Arab personality and its total assimilation within the
existing Arab states. While this might have been possible
before 1967 and even for some time afterwards, the accretion
of political and military power by Palestinians as Palestinians,
rather than as the representatives of other Arab states, has
made it extremely hard to imagine a situation where they
could once more be submerged.
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The Palestinian movement springs from the Palestinian
dispersion, which is spread throughout the Middle East and
some parts of Western Europe and which was in danger of being
accepted as a permanent feature. Many Palestinians deny that
their identity was in fact being lost through a total assimi-
lation with other Arab communities and claim that it was
analogous only to the Jews prior to the state of Israel— that
is to say, some were more assimilated than others. Leaders
of the Palestinian movement now say that the twenty-year
period from 1948 was a period in which they put their faith
in the ability of Arab governments to secure an agreement
with Israel which would have overcome for the Palestinians
the disasters caused by the 1948 war. Owing to the failure
of Arab governments to succeed for them, they say they have
come to the conclusion that they have no alternative than to
carry on the struggle themselves, as Palestinians.
The Palestinian movement is of significance to Israel
and to the Arab states because it projects the whole dispute
on to an entirely different basis, hardly considered since
before 1948, and because it takes away from Arab governments
the initiative for conducting the argument. It has additional
significance to both sides because part of the main
Palestinian ideology is a revolutionary one which claims that
the problems of the whole area cannot be solved without a
whole-scale revolution, and indeed blames Arab governments 1
failure to triumph over Zionism on the fact that the Arab
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world itself is in need of a revolution before it can
successfully overcome the Zionist state.
Thus, there is a basic and inherent conflict of interest
likely to develop between those Palestinians who believe they
are part of an overall Arab revolution which will incidentally
sweep Zionism away in its path and those Arabs who believe
that the Arab society is basically and structurally sound but
is threatened by the Zionist enclave. At some stage it must
be the Palestinian intention to persuade enough Jewish
citizens within Israel that they would be better off accommo-
dating the Palestinians in something like a bi-national state
than preserving the Zionist state of today with the high price
in terms of conflict which that would involve.
It is not clear whether the Palestinians base their
expectation of ultimate victory on the probability of an
internal conversion within Israel, leading to an accommodation
and to the creation of a bi-national Palestinian state, or
whether they accept that such a solution can only be imposed
after a long battle. If it is after a conversion that they
believe a settlement will come, one has to examine the
circumstances in which such a conversion could take place.
At present, the Palestinian view is that a peace movement
will develop among Israeli Jews as a result of the continuous
military pressure exercised from outside by Palestinians,
combined with a general wish among Israeli Jews to live in
peace and end what has already been a sixty-years war. This
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wish will first find expression in the attempts to put an end
to the war unilaterally— for instance by continuing the policy
of retaliation and suppression in the occupied area. However,
the Palestinians maintain that at some later stage the manifest
failure of this policy will cause Israel to reevaluate her
position and once this process starts, the move away from
Zionism will itself start.
This thinking is based on the most optimistic prospect of
the future. But there are several other probabilities. The
Arab-Jew confrontation within the context of Palestine is not
taking place in a political vacuum elsewhere in the Middle
East. The interactions of Arab governments and the Palestine
movement will have just as much influence over a future
course of events as any interaction between Arab and Jew
within Palestine.
Some Palestinians argue that the Israeli conversion which
they seek will not be achievable by Palestinians alone
through the technique of gradual and continuous guerrilla
activity. They recognize that this may simply encourage the
siege mentality among Israeli Jews which is so easily stimu-
lated by the Israeli government. In their search for some
other method of stimulating this mass conversion within
Israel they believe that some kind of military shock treat-
ment, by an Arab government, might also have the desired
effect. They believe that this military activity would not
necessarily lead to the defeat of Israel as such--and indeed
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it could not do so on the ground. But a military setback
might of itself break the over-confidence of the Israelis
enough to make them reconsider the possibility of an
accommodation with the Arabs.
But as far as the Palestinians are concerned, there is a
danger in this approach. In creating the conditions necessary
for giving the Israelis a real shock they would require great
cooperation and military mobilization from Arab governments.
As a result, they would themselves lose the essentially
Palestinian nature of the problem which they have succeeded
in creating in the years since the 1967 war. This seems to
be the central dilemma of the Palestinian movement. For
twenty years they relied an Arab governments to solve the
problem for them, and that reliance was ill-placed. So they
came to recognize that they would have to solve it for
themselves, though they expect their own revolution also to
have a contagious effect on Arab states.
Naturally enough, existing Arab governments are reluctant
to espouse completely a cause which proclaims that the effects
of its own revolutionary fervour will be to cause revolution
in other Arab states. But one thing the Palestinians them-
selves seem to ignore is that a too-close partnership with
existing governments would itself lead to the submersion of
their identity within the overall Arab personality and to a
solution of the Israeli problem along government-to-government
lines which would be unlikely to involve the creation of a
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separate and independent state of Palestine. It is thus in
the Palestinians ' own interest to keep detached from Arab
governments and to pursue their political objective without
too much categorical support from the host governments of
those Arab countries adjacent to Israel. Otherwise, the
dispute settles back to one between Israel and her neighbors,
to the exclusion of any Palestinian element—and this, I
believe, could only lead to an artificial and unnatural
settlement.
I do not actually believe that the conquest of Israel is
possible by force of arms as it appears the Palestinians do.
What is possible, however, is that the pressure exercised
politically and militarily against Israel, continuously from
the outside, might over along period induce the Israeli popu-
lation itself to take political actions which could reduce
that pressure without affecting their military security.
This is a difficult exercise for the Palestinians to conduct.
With one hand they have to brandish the threat of an increased
rate of guerrilla activities while with the other they have
to hold out the possibility that they would agree to some
political accommodation of a genuine nature offered by an
Israeli government, which would help to reduce the military
pressure and would pave the way to a more lasting arrangement
between Jews and Arabs within the area of Palestine.
It is my contention that the conflict between the two
communities cannot be considered a moral one owing to the
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moral conviction of both sides. Since this conviction exists,
the chances of any rational switch of policy as a result of
intellectual persuasion are almost non-existent. It is a
problem of power, not of morality. When looking at the future
and as the possiblity of an ideal structure developing, based
on a bi-national state in the area of Palestine, one therefore
has to see if it is possible to detect a point at which pro-
gress towards the ideal can develop indirectly as a result of
a position on the ground—by induction from physical factors
rather than by promotion from the mind.
Within the Camp David framework, Israeli colonization
policies in the Occupied Territories have been changing the
situation on the ground so rapidly that before long the
physical basis of a Palestinian settlement will have been
removed for all time. No Arab regime (including Egypt) can
be reconciled to the permanent loss of the Occupied Territories
Israeli retention of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East
Jerusalem maximizes the probability of Arab reaction. The
religious ferment in the region could reconfirm Jerusalem's
credentials as a catalyst for crusaders. Continued public
silence by Washington on Israel's colonization policies is
no asset to the United States in the Arab world. It
reinforces the already formidable Israeli constituency against
the evacuation of the Occupied Territories.
In closing, one should remember that no amount of
diplomacy in the past has managed to prevent the Palestine
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problem being endemic to Middle East tensions in some form
or other for the last sixty years. However, Israel must
remember that in the course of history, "the pendulum swings."
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APPENDIX A
ARTICLE 22 OF THE COVENANT
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
28 June 1919
Article 22
. To those colonies and territories which as
a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and
which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by them-
selves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,
there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civiliza-
tion and that securities for the performance of this trust
should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this prin-
ciple is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted
to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their
experience or their geographical position can best undertake
this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and
that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories
on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to
the stage of the development of the people, the geographical
situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other
similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish
Empire have reached a stage of development where their exis-
tence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized
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subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assis-
tance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to
stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a prin-
cipal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are
at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for
the administration of the territory under conditions which
will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject
only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the pro-
hibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic
and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establish-
ment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of
military training of the natives for other than police pur-
poses and the defence of territory, and will also secure
equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Mem-
bers of the League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and
certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the
sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their
remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geo-
graphical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and
other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws
of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, "sub-
ject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of
the indigenous population.
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In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to
the Council an annual report in reference to the territory
committed to its charge.
The degree of authority, control or administration to
be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed
upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in
each case by the Council.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive
and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to




THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE, 24 JULY 19 22
"The Council of the League of Nations:
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the
purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Manda-
tory selected by the said Powers the administration of the
territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish
Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that
the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect
the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the
Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said
Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly under-
stood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities
in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country; and
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the his-
torical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and to
the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that
country; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His
Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and
54
Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been
formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council
of the League for approval; and
Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate
in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on
behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the follow-
ing provisions; and
Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8)
,
it is provided that the degree of authority, control or admin-
istration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been
previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be
explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;
Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:
Article 1
The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and
of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms
of this mandate.
Article 2
The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the coun-
try under such political, administrative and economic condi-
tions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national
home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of
self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the
civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine,
irrespective of race and religion.
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Article 3
The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit,
encourage local autonomy.
Article 4
An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a
public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with
the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and
other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish
national home and the interests of the Jewish population in
Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Adminis-
tration, to assist and take part in the development of the
country.
The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization
and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appro-
priate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take
steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government
to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to
assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
Article 5
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no
Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any




The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the
rights and position of other sections of the population are
not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under
suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with
the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement
by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not
required for public purposes.
Article 7
The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for
enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this
law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of
Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent
residence in Palestine.
Article 8
The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including
the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as for-
merly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire,
shall not be applicable in Palestine.
Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-
mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall
have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment,
or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified
period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expira-
tion of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their
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entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed
upon between the Powers concerned.
Article 9
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the
judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to for-
eigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their
rights.
Respect for the personal status of the various peoples
and communities and for their religious interests shall be
fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administra-
tion of Waqfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious
law and the dispositions of the founders.
Article 10
Pending the making of special extradition agreements
relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force
between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to
Palestine.
Article 11
The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary
measures to safeguard the interests of the community in con-
nection with the development of the country, and, subject to
any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall
have full power to provide for public ownership or control of
any of the natural resources of the country or of the public
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works, services and utilities established or to be established
therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the
needs of the country having regard, among other things, to the
desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive
cultivation of the land.
The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency
mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and
equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities,
and to develop any of the natural resources of the country,
in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the
Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no
profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly,
shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital,
and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the bene-
fit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.
Article 12
The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the
foreign relations of Palestine, and the right to issue exe-
quaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall
also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection
to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.
Article 13
All responsibility in connexion with the Holy Places and
religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of
preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the
59
Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exer-
cise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public
order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be
responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters
connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article
shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrange-
ments as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for
the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into
effect; and provided also that nothing in this Mandate shall
be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to
interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem
sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.
Article 14
A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory
to study, define and determine the rights and claims in con-
nection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relat-
ing to the different religious communities in Palestine. The
method of nomination, the composition and the functions of
this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the
League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be
appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of
the Council.
Article 15
The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of con-
science and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject
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only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are
ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made
between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race,
religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Pales-
tine on the sole ground of his religious belief.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools
for the education of its own members in its own language,
while conforming to such educational requirements of a general
nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied
or impaired.
Article 16
The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such
supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all
faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of
public order and good government. Subject to such supervision,
no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or inter-
fere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate
against any representative or member of them on the ground of
his religion or nationality.
Article 17
The Administration of Palestine may organize on a volun-
tary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace
and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject,
however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not
use them for purposes other than those above specified save
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with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes,
no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained
by the Administration of Palestine.
Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration
of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance
of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.
The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the
roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of
armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.
Article 18
The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination
in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the
League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its
laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any for-
eign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navi-
gation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the
treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly,
there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods
originating in or destined for any of the said States, and
there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions
across the mandated area.
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this
mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice
of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it
may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think
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best to promote the development of the natural resources of
the country and to safeguard the interests of the population.
It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a
special customs agreement with any State the territory of
which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.
Article 19
The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administra-
tion of Palestine to any general international conventions
already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with
the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave
traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic
in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of tran-
sit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic
and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial
property.
Article 20
The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Adminis-
tration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other
conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy
adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating
disease, including diseases of plants and animals.
Article 21
The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve
months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a
63
Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law
shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excava-
tions and archaeological research to the nationals of all
States Members of the League of Nations...
Article 22
English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official lan-
guages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic
on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew
and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated
in Arabic.
Article 23
The Administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy
days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days
of rest for the members of such communities.
Article 24
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of
Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council
as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the
provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations
promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated
with the report.
Article 25
In the territories lying between the Jordan and the east-
ern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the
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Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council
of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application
of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inap-
plicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such
provision for the administration of the territories as he may
consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action
shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of
Articles 15, 16 and 18.
Article 26
The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should
arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League
of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application
of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot
be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent
Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 27
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is
required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.
Article 28
In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby
conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of
Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed neces-
sary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the
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League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall
use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the
League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour
the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Admin-
istration of Palestine during the period of the mandate,
including the rights of public servants to pensions or
gratuities.
The present instrument shall be deposited in original in
the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies
shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations to all Members of the League.
Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thou-
sand nine hundred and twenty-two."




RESOLUTION 181 (II) ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL





Having met in special session at the request of the man-
datory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee
to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future
government of Palestine at the second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it
to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the prob-
lem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution
of the problem, and
Having received and examined the report of the Special
2Committee (document A/ 364) including a number of unanimous
recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union
approved by the majority of the Special Committee,
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one
which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly
relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power
that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by
1 August 19 48;
See Official Records of the Second Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly, Supplement No. II, Volumes I-IV.
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Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power
for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations
the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future
government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Eco-
nomic Union set out below;
Requests that
(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as
provided for in the plan for its implementation;
(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances dur-
ing the transitional period require such consideration,
whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to
the peace and security, the Security Council should supplement
the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures,
under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United
Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exer-
cise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by
this resolution;
(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accord-
ance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by
force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsi-
bilities envisaged for it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such
steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into
effect;
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Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain
from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carry-
ing out of these recommendations, and
Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and
subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred
to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and
in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the cir-
cumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary
staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the





Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Work-
ing Capital Fund a sum not to exceed $2,000,000 for the pur-
poses set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on
the future government of Palestine.
Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting, 29 November
1947 .
At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on
29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the
terms of the above, resolution, elected the following members
of the United Nations Commission on Palestine :
Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.
3This resolution was adopted without reference to a
Committee.
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PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION
PART I
Future Constitution and Government of Palestine
A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE
1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as
possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be pro-
gressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be com-
pleted as soon as possible but in any case not later than
1 August 19 48.
The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far
in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Man-
date and to evacuate each area.
The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to
ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish
State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide
facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated
at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than
1 February 19 48.
3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special
International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in
part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine
two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the
mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later
than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the
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Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described
in parts II and III below.
4. The period between the adoption by the General
Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine
and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and
Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE
1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one rep-
resentative of each of five Member States. The Members rep-
resented on the Commission shall be elected by the General
Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise,
as possible.
2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the manda-
tory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned
over to the Commission; which shall act in conformity with the
recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance
of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the
fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal
with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer
areas which have been evacuated.
In the discharge of this administrative responsibility
the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regu-
lations and take other measures as required.
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The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent,
obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the
measures recommended by the General Assembly.
3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall pro-
ceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the fron-
tiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem
in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations
of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Never-
theless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan
are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule
will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing rea-
sons make that necessary.
4. The Commission, after consultation with the demo-
cratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and
Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as
rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The
activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils
of Government shall be carried out under the general direction
of the Commission.
If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government
cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected,
cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communi-
cate that fact to the Security Council for such action with
respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper,
and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members
of the United Nations.
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5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations,
during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of
Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full
authority in the areas under their control, including authority
over matters of immigration and land regulation.
6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State,
acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from
the Commission full responsibility for the administration of
that State in the period between the termination of the Man-
date and the establishment of the State's independence.
7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Coun-
cils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after
their formation, to proceed to the establishment of adminis-
trative organs of government, central and local.
8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State
shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed
militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number
to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.
This armed militia in each State shall, for operational
purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers
resident in that. State, but general political and military
control, including the choice of the militia's High Command,
shall be exercised by the Commission.
9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State
shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the
armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the
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Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic
lines.
The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up
by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the
Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this elec-
tion shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are:
(a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs
and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian
citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of inten-
tion to become citizens of such State.
Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who
have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the
Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State,
shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish states
respectively
.
Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent
Assemblies.
During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted
to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State,
and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the
area of -the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of
the Commission.
10. The Constitutent Assembly of each State shall draft
a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provi-
sional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Gov-
ernment appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of
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the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration
provided for in section C below and include inter alia provi-
sions for:
(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected
by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of
proportional representation, and an executive body responsible
to the legislature;
(b) Settling all international disputes in which the
State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered;
(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in
its international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations;
(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory
rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and
the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including freedom of religion, language, speech and publica-
tion, education, assembly and association;
(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all resi-
dents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the
City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national
security, provided that each State shall control residence
within its borders.
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11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic
commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are
possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establish-
ing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint
Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
12. During the period between the adoption of the recom-
mendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assem-
bly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in
Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administra-
tion in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed
forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in
the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory
Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution
of its functions.
13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be conti-
nuity in the functioning of administrative services and that,
on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power,
the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provi-
sional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively,
acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive
transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of
responsibility for all the functions of government, including
that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the
forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.
14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by
the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such
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instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary
to issue.
The measures taken by the Commission, within the recom-
mendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately
effective unless the Commission has previously received con-
trary instructions from the Security Council.
The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress
reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security
Council
.
15. The Commission shall make its final report to the
next regular session of the General Assembly and to the
Security Council simultaneously.
C. DECLARATION
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the
provisional government of each proposed State before indepen-
dence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:
GENERAL PROVISION
The stipulations contained in the declaration are recog-
nized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation
or official action shall conflict or interfere with these




Holy Places , Religious Buildings and Sites
1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and reli-
gious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty
of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in con-
formity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens
of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as
to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to
requirements of national security, public order and decorum.
Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in
conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance
of public order and decorum.
3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall
be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way
impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to
the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious
building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government
may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry
out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at
the expense of the community or communities concerned if no
action is taken within a reasonable time.
4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy
Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxa-
tion on the date of the creation of the State.
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No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be
made which would either discriminate between the owners or
occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or
would place such owners or occupiers in a position less
favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation
than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's
recommendations
.
5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the
right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution
of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings
and sites within the borders of the State and the religious
rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and
respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing
rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the dif-
ferent religious communities or the rites of a religious com-
munity with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He
shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immu-
nities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in
the State.
CHAPTER 2
Religious and Minority Rights
1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all
forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public
order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
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2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between
the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or
sex.
3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State
shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
4. The family law and personal status of the various
minorities and their religious interests, including endowments,
shall be respected.
5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of
public order and good government, no measure shall be taken
to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or
charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against
any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of
his religion or nationality.
6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary
education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in
its own language and its cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools
for the education of its own members in its own language,
while conforming to such educational requirements of a general
nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or
impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue
their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by
any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse,
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in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of
any kind, or at public meetings. 4
8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the
Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) 5 shall be allowed
except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation





1. Citizenship . Palestinian citizens residing in Pal-
estine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and
Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Pal-
estine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recogni-
tion of independence, become citizens of the State in which
they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.
Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one
year from the date of recognition of independence of the State
in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State,
4 The following stipulation shall be added to the declara-
tion concerning the Jewish State: "In the Jewish State ade-
quate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking citizens
for the use of their language, either orally or in writing,
in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration."
In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words
"by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced by the
words "by a Jew in the Arab State."
providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed
Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the
proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed
Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in
the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option
will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen
years of age of persons so opting.
Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State
and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who
have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of
the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to
the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.
2. International conventions . (a) The State shall be
bound by all the international agreements and conventions,
both general and special, to which Palestine has become a
party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for
therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected
by the State throughout the period for which they were
concluded.
(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued
validity of international conventions or treaties signed or
adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall
be referred to the International Court of Justice in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
3. Financial obligations . (a) The State shall respect
and fulfill all financial obligations of whatever nature
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assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during
the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State.
This provision includes the right of public servants to pen-
sions, compensation or gratuities.
(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through partici-
pation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obli-
gations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually
in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable
between, the States.
(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic
Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United
Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one
representative of the State concerned, should be established.
Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respect-
ing claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to
that Court.
(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any
part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by
the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to
their terms, unless modified by agreement between the
concession-holder and the State.
CHAPTER 4
Miscellaneous Provisions
1. The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration
shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no
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modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the
General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the
United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention
of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction
of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may
thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in
the circumstances.
2. Any dispute relating to the application or the inter-
pretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the
request of either party, to the International Court of Jus-
tice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT
1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State
shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic
Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the
Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing
to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation
of representative organizations and bodies from each of the
proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish
the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters
of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Coun-
cils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the
undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.
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The Economic Union of Palestine
2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine
shall be:
(a) A customs union;
(b) A joint currency system providing for a single for-
eign exchange rate;
(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-
discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways;
postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and ports and
airports involved in international trade and commerce.
(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of
irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
(d) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem
on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.
3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board,
which shall consist of three representatives of each of the
two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign mem-
bers shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of
three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as rep-
resentatives of States.
4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be
to implement either directly or by delegation the measures
necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union.
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It shall have all powers of organization and administration
necessary to fulfill its functions.
5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect
the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's deci-
sions shall be taken by a majority vote.
6. In the event of failure of a State to take the neces-
sary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide
to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs
revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the
Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to
cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote
upon such further sanctions, -including disposition of funds
it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.
7. In relation to economic development, the functions
of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encour-
agement of joint development projects, but it shall not under-
take such projects except with the assent of both States and
the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly
involved in the development project.
8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies
circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall
be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board,
which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall
determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.
9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above,
each State may operate its own central bank, control its own
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fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and
expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct
international financial operations on its own faith and
credit. During the first two years after the termination of
the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority
to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that--to
the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the
two States from the export of goods and services permit, and
provided that each State takes appropriate measures to con-
serve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall
have available, in any twelve months 1 period, foreign exchange
sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported
goods and services for consumption in its territory equiva-
lent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in
that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December
1947.
10. All economic authority not specifically vested in
the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.
11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete
freedom of trade between the States, and between the States
and the City of Jerusalem.
12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff
Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the
States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint
Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of
disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic
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Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event
that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by
a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine
the tariff schedule.
13. The following items shall be a first charge on the
customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:
(a) The expenses of the customs service and of the
operation of the joint services;
(b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic
Board;
(c) The financial obligations of the Administration
of Palestine consisting of:
(i) The service of the outstanding public debt;
(ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now
being paid or falling due in the future, in
accordance with the rules and to the extent
established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3
above
.
14. After these obligations have been met in full, the
surplus revenue from the customs and other common services
shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5
per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusa-
lem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the
Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of main-
taining a sufficient and suitable level of government and
social services in each State, except that the share of either
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State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution
to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approxi-
mately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted
may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in
relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the estab-
lishment of the Union. After five years, the priciples of
the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the
Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.
15. All international conventions and treaties affecting
customs tariff rates, and those communications services under
the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered
into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall
be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the
Joint Economic Board.
16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure
for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets
17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board
shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
Freedom of Transit and Visit
18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving
freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of
both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security
considerations; provided that each State and the City shall
control residence within its borders.
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Termination , Modification and
Interpretation of the Undertaking
19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom
shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall
continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect
two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking
and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except
by consent of both parties and with the approval of the Gen-
eral Assembly.
21. Any dispute relating to the application or the inter-
pretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom
shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the
International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to
another mode of settlement.
E. ASSETS
1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine
shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City
of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be
made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B,
paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the prop-
erty of the government of the territory in which they are
situated.
2. During the period between the appointment of the
United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate,
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the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary
operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which
it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or
encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such
as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Govern-
ment bond issues, State lands or any other asset.
F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish
State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the
declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have
been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration
should be given to its application for admission to membership
in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the







The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus
separatum under a special international regime and shall be
administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council
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shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the
Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.
B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present munici-
pality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns,
the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern,
Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the
built-up area of Motsa) ; and the most northern Shu'fat, as
indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B)
.
C. STATUTE OF THE CITY
The Trusteeship Council "shall, within five months of the
approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed
Statute of the City which shall contain inter alia the sub-
stance of the following provisions:
1. Government machinery; special objectives . The Admin-
istering Authority in discharging its administrative obliga-
tions shall pursue the following special objectives:
(a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and
religious interests located in the city of the three great
monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish
and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and
especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
(b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of
the city in their own interests as well as in order to
encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual
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relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the
Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any con-
structive measures of development of the residents, having
regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various
peoples and communities.
2. Governor and administrative staff . A Governor of
the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship
Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected
on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to
nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either
State in Palestine.
The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the
City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of admin-
istration, including the conduct of external affairs. He
shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as inter-
national officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter
and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city
and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis.
A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of
the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship
Council and duly approved by it.
3. Local autonomy . (a) The existing local autonomous
units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and
municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government
and administration.
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(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consid-
eration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for
the establishment of special town units consisting, respec-
tively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem.
The new town units shall continue to form part of the present
municipality of Jerusalem.
4. Security measures . (a) The City of Jerusalem shall
be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and pre-
served, and no para-military formations, exercises or activi-
ties shall be permitted within its borders.
(b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem
be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation
or interference of one or more sections of the population,
the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as
may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the
administration
.
(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and
order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places
and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor
shall organize a special police force of adequate strength,
the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine.
The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary pro-
vision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.
5. Legislative organization . A Legislative Council,
elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nation-
ality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and
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proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation
and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, con-
flict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth
in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or
official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant
to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with
the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It
shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in
case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essen-
tial to the normal functioning of the administration.
6. Administration of justice . The Statute shall pro-
vide for the establishment of an independent judiciary sys-
tem, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the
City shall be subject to it.
7. Economic union and economic regime . The City of
Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Pales-
time and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and
of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions
of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic
Board shall be established in the territory of the City.
The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic
matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union,
on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for
all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.
8. Freedom of transit and vis it; control of residents .
Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare
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as determined by the Governor under the directions of the
Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence
within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the
residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigra-
tion into, and residence within, the borders of the city for
nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor
under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.
9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish States . Repre-
sentatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited
to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection
of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion
with the international administration of the City.
10. Official languages . Arabic and Hebrew shall be the
official languages of the city. This will not preclude the
adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may
be required.
11. Citizenship . All the residents shall become ipso
facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for
citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or,
if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become
citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according
to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan.
The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for con-
sular protection of the citizens of the City outside its
territory.
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12- Freedoms of citizens . (a) Subject only to the
requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of
the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, reli-
gion and worship, language, education, speech and Press,
assembly and association, and petition.
(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between
the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language
or sex.
(c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to
equal protection of the laws.
(d) The family law and personal status of the various
persons and communities and their religious interests, includ-
ing endowments, shall be respected.
(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of
public order and good government, no measure shall be taken
to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or
charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against
any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of
his religion or nationality.
(f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary
education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively,
in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural
traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools
for the education of its own members in its own language,
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while conforming to such educational requirements of a gen-
eral nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or
impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue
their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by
any inhabitant of the City of any language in private inter-
course, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publica-
tions of any kind, or at public meetings.
13. Holy Places . (a) Existing rights in respect of Holy
Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied
or impaired.
(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious build-
ings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be
secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the "
requirements of public order and decorum.
(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall
be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way
impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to
the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious build-
ing or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may
call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out
such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the
expense of the community or communities concerned if no action
is taken within a reasonable time.
(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy
Place, religious building or site which was exempt from
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taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change
in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would
either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy
Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such
owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation
to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time
of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
14
. Special powers of the Governor in respect of the
Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in
any part of Palestine . (a) The protection of the Holy Places,
religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusa-
lem shall be a special concern of the Governor.
(b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites
in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine,
on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions
of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions
of the' Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith
and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being
properly applied and respected.
(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make deci-
sions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes
which may arise between the different religious communities
or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy
Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine
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In this task he may be assisted by a consultative coun-
cil of representatives of different denominations acting in
an advisory capacity.
D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the
aforementioned principles shall come into force not later
than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first
instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship
Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of
these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of
this period the whole scheme shall be subject to reexamina-
tion by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experi-
ence acquired with its functioning. The residents of the
City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum




States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Pal-
estine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including
the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as for-
merly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire,
are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the
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re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the
proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem
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APPENDIX D
RESOLUTION 186 (S-2) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 14 MAY 194 8 CONCERNING THE
APPOINTMENT OF A UN MEDIATOR
The General Assembly
,
Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestine,
I
Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the
Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon
all Governments, organizations and persons to co-operate in
making effective such a truce;
II
1. Empowers a United Nations Mediator in Palestine, to
be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of
representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America, to exercise the following functions:
(a) To use his good offices with the local and community
authorities in Palestine to:
i. Arrange for the operation of common services
necessary to the safety and well-being of the
population of Palestine;
ii. Assure the protection of the Holy Places, reli-
gious buildings and sites in Palestine;
iii. Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future
situation of Palestine.
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(b) To co-operate with the Truce Commission for Pales-
tine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of
23 April 1948.
(c) To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view
to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Pales-
tine, the assistance and co-operation of appropriate special
agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health
Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other
governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humani-
tarian and non-political character;
2. Instructs the United Nations Mediator to render
progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems
necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary-
General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations;
3. Directs the United Nations Mediator to conform in
his activities with the provisions of this resolution, and
with such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security
Council may issue;
4. Authorize the Secretary-General to pay the United
Nations Mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the
President of the International Court of Justice, and to pro-
vide the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carry-




Relieves the Palestine Commission from the further exer-
cise of responsibilities under resolution 181 (11) of
29 November 19 47.
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APPENDIX E
CABLEGRAM DATED 15 MAY 1948 FROM THE
FOREIGN SECRETARY OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
(UN DOCUMENT S/747)
[Original text : English ]
15 May 194 8
Have honour inform you that National Council for Jewish
State consisting of members of elected representative Jewish
bodies Palestine which had applied to United Nations Palestine
Commission for recognition as Provisional Council Government
under part one B four of resolution of General Assembly on
29 November 1947 met yesterday 14 May and issued proclamation
declaring following:
"On 29 November 1947 General Assembly of United
Nations adopted resolution for establishment of indepen-
dent Jewish State in Palestine and called upon inhabitants
of country to take such steps as may be necessary on their
part to put the plan into effect. This recognition by
United Nations of right of Jewish people to establish
their independent State may not be revoked. It is more-
over self evident right of Jewish people to be a nation
as all other nations in its own sovereign State. Accord-
ingly we members of National Council representing Jewish
people in Palestine and Zionist movement, met together in
solemn assembly today, day of termination of British Man-
date for Palestine, by virtue of natural and historic
right of Jewish people and of resolution of General Assembly
hereby proclaim establishment of Jewish State in Palestine
to be called Israel. We hereby declare that as from ter-
mination of Mandate this night of 14 to 15 May 1948 and
until setting up of duly elected bodies of State in accord-
ance with constitution to be drawn up by constituent
assembly not later than 1 October 1948 present National
Council shall act as Provisional State Council and its
executive organ shall constitute Provisional Government of
State of Israel. State of Israel will be open to immigra-
tion of Jews from all countries of dispersion, will pro-
mote development of country for benefit of all inhabitants,
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will be based on precepts of liberty, justice, and peace,
will uphold full social and political equality of all
citizens without distinction race, creed or sex, will
guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education,
culture and language, will safeguard sanctity and inviola-
bility of shrines and Holy Places of all religions and
will dedicate itself to principles of United Nations
Charter. State of Israel will be ready to co-operate with
organs and representatives of United Nations in implemen-
tation of resolution of Assembly of 29 November 1947 and
will take steps to bring about economic union over whole
of Palestine. We appeal to United Nations to assist Jew-
ish people in building of its State and to admit Israel
into family of nations."
Accordingly I beg declare on behalf of Provisional Gov-
ernment of State of Israel its readiness to sign declaration
and undertaking provided for respectively in part one C and
part one D of resolution of Assembly and beg hereby to apply
for admission of State of Israel to membership family of
nations.





RESOLUTION 194 (III) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 11 DECEMBER 1948 CONCERNING THE
CONCILIATION COMMISSION, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME
OF JERUSALEM, AND THE RETURN OF REFUGEES
The General Assembly
,
Having considered further the situation in Palestine,
1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress
achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations
Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future
situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his
life; and
Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his
staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in
Palestine;
2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of
three States Members of the United Nations which shall have
the following functions:
(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary
in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United
Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the
General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
(b) To carry out the specific functions and direc-
tives given to it by the present resolution and such addi-
tional functions and directives as may be given to it by the
General Assembly or by the Security Council;
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(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security
Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United
Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce
Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such
request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Coun-
cil with respect to all the remaining functions of the United
Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolu-
tions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;
3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting
of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall
present, before the end of the first part of the present ses-
sion of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly,
a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will
constitute the Conciliation Commission;
4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at
once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the
parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible
date;
5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned
to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the
Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek
agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Concilia-
tion Commission or directly, with a view to the final settle-
ment of all questions outstanding between them;
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6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps
to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve
a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;
7. Resolves that the Holy Places— including Nazareth-
religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected
and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing
rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end
should be under effective United Nations supervision; that
the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to
the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its
detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for
the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations
concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with
regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Com-
mission should call upon the political authorities of the
areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to
the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and
that these undertakings should be presented to the General
Assembly for approval;
8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three
world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present
municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and
towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most
southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including
also the built-up area of Motsa) ; and the most northern
Shu 1 fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment
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from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effec-
tive United Nations control;
Requests the Security Council to take further steps
to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest
possible date;
Instructs the Commission to present to the fourth
regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals
for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area
which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for dis-
tinctive groups consistent with the special international
status of the Jerusalem area;
The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint
a United Nations representative, who shall co-operate with
the local authorities with respect to the interim administra-
tion of the Jerusalem area;
9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed
arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned,
the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air
should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report
immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action
by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;
10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek
arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned
which will facilitate the economic development of the area,
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including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and
the use of transportation and communication facilities;
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to
their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which,
under principles of international law or in equity, should be
made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate
the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social reha-
bilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation,
and to maintain close relations with the Director of the
United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through
him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United
Nations;
12. Authorize the Conciliation Commission to appoint
such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts,
acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the
effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities
under the present resolution;
The Conciliation Commission will have its official
headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for
maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking
all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commis-
sion. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number
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of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the
Commission;
13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render
progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for
transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of
the United Nations;
14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned
to cooperate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all
possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present
resolution;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the neces-
sary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements
to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the
terms of the present resolution.
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APPENDIX G
RESOLUTION 273 (III) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 11 MAY 194 9 CONCERNING THE
ADMISSION OF ISRAEL TO UN MEMBERSHIP
Having received the report of the Security Council on
the application of Israel for membership in the United
Nations,
Noting that, in the judgment of the Security Council,
Israel is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to
carry out the obligations contained in the Charter,
Noting that the Security Council has recommended to the
General Assembly that it admit Israel to membership in the
United Nations,
Noting furthermore the declaration by the State of Israel
that it "unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United
Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day
when it becomes a Member of the United Nations,"
gRecalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and
911 December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and
explanations made by the representative of the Government of
See document A/818.
7 See document S/1093.
g
See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during
its second session, pages 131-132.
See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during
Part I of its third session, pages 21-25.
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Israel before the ad hoc Political Committee in respect of
the implementation of the said resolutions,
The General Assembly
,
Acting in discharge of its functions under Article 4 of
the Charter and rule 125 of its rules of procedure,
1. Decides that Israel is a peace-loving State which
accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is able
and willing to carry out those obligations;




11 May 1949 .
See documents A/AC. 24/SR. 45-48 , 50 and 51.
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APPENDIX H
RESOLUTION 3 03 (IV) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 9 DECEMBER 194 9 CONCERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR JERUSALEM
The General Assembly
,
Having regard to its resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November
1947 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,
Having studied the reports of the United Nations Con-




, in relation to Jerusalem,
Believing that the principles underlying its previous
resolutions concerning this matter, and in particular its
resolution of 29 November 1947, represent a just and equitable
settlement of the question,
1. To restate, therefore, its intention that Jerusalem
should be placed under a permanent international regime, which
should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of
the Holy Places, both within and outside Jerusalem, and to
confirm specifically the following provisions of General
Assembly Resolution 181 (II): (1) the City of Jerusalem shall
be established as a corpus separatum under a special interna-
tional regime and shall be administered by the United Nations;
(2) The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge
the responsibilities of the Administering Authority...; and
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(3) the City of Jerusalem shall include the present munici-
pality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns,
the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern,
Bethlehem; the most western 'Ein Karim (including also the
built-up area of Motsa) ; and the most northern, Shu'fat, as
indicated on the attached sketch-map;
2. To request for this purpose that the Trusteeship
Council at its next session, whether special or regular, com-
plete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem, omitting
the new inapplicable provisions, such as articles 32 and 39,
and, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of the
international regime for Jerusalem set forth in General
Assembly resolution 181 (II) introducing therein amendments
in the direction of its greater democratization, approve the
Statute, and proceed immediately with its implementation.
The Trusteeship Council shall not allow any actions taken by
any interested Government or Governments to divert it from
adopting and implementing the Statute of Jerusalem;
II
Calls upon the States concerned to make formal undertak-
ings, at an early date and in the light of their obligations
as Members of the United Nations, that they will approach




RESOLUTION 237 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
OF 14 JUNE 1967 CONCERNING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The Security Council
,
Considering the urgent need to spare the civil popula-
tions and the prisoners of the war in the area of conflict
in the Middle East additional sufferings,
Considering that essential and inalienable human rights
should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,
Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved
in the conflict,
1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the
safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas
where military operations have taken place and to facilitate
the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since
the outbreak of hostilities;
2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupu-
lous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the
treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian
persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the effec-




RESOLUTION 2252 (ES-V) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY




Considering the urgent need to alleviate the suffering
inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a result of
the recent hostilities in the Middle East,
1. Welcomes with great satisfaction Security Council
resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, whereby the Council:
(a) Considered the urgent need to spare the civil
populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict
in the Middle East additional sufferings;
(b) Considered that essential and inalienable rights
should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war;
(c) Considered that all the obligations of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties
involved in the conflict;
(d) Called upon the Government of Israel to ensure
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the
areas where military operations had taken place and to facili-
tate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas
since the outbreak of hostilities;
1:LUnited Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950, No. 972.
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(e) Recommended to the Governments concerned the
scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing
the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of
civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Con-
12
ventions of 12 August 1949;
(f) Requested the Secretary-General to follow the
effective implementation of the resolution and to report to
the Security Council;
2. Notes with gratitude and satisfaction and endorses
the appeal made by the President of the General Assembly on
26 June 1967; l3
3
.
Notes with gratification the work undertaken by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red
Cross Societies and other voluntary organizations to provide
humanitarian assistance to civilians;
4. Notes further with gratification the assistance
which the United Nations Children's Fund is providing to
women and children in the area;
5. Commends the Commissioner-General of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East for his- efforts to continue the activities of the
Agency in the present situation with respect to all persons





See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth
Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings , 1536th meeting,
paras. 29-37.
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6. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of the
above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the efforts of
the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pro-
vide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an
emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons
in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious
need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent
hostilities;
7. Welcomes the close co-operation of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East, and of the other organizations concerned, for the pur-
pose of co-ordinating assistance;
8. Calls upon all the Member States concerned to facili-
tate the transport of supplies to all areas in which assist-
ance is being rendered;
9. Appeals to all Governments, as well as organizations
and individuals, to make special contributions for the above
purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East and also to the other
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned;
10. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with
the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to
report urgently to the General Assembly on the needs arising
under paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
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11. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow the
effective implementation of the present resolution and to
report thereon to the General Assembly.
1548th plenary meeting ;
4 July 1967 .
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APPENDIX K
RESOLUTION 2253 (ES-V) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 4 JULY 1967 CONCERNING MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL
TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM
The General Assembly
,
Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusa-
lem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the
status of the City,
1. Considers that these measures are invalid;
2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already
taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which
would alter the status of Jerusalem;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and
on the implementation of the present resolution not later






RESOLUTION 2254 (ES-V) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 14 JULY 1967 CONCERNING MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL
TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM
The General Assembly
,
Recalling its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,
Having received the report submitted by the Secretary-
General
,
Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the
non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V)
,
1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement General
Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V)
;
2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to
rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith
from taking any action which would alter the status of
Jerusalem;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation
and on the implementation of the present resolution.
1554th plenary meeting
,
14 July 1967 .
A/6753. For the printed text of this document, see
Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year ,




RESOLUTION 242 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1967 CONCERNING THE SITUATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Security Council
,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situa-
tion in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting
peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have under-
taken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the
Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East which should include the application of both the
following principles:
i. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conflict;
ii. Termination of all claims or states of belliger-
ency and respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and recog-
nized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
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2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability
and political independence of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to pro-
mote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and
accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and
principles in this resolution;
4
.
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.
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APPENDIX N
RESOLUTION 252 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DATED 21 MAY 196 8 CONCERNING MEASURES TAKEN BY
ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM
The Security Council
,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and
2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967,
Having considered the letter (S/8560) of the Permanent
Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and
the report of the Secretary-General (S/8146)
,
Having heard the statements made before the Council,
Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned
resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in
contravention of those resolutions,
Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting
peace,
Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by military
conquest is inadmissible,
1. Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with the
General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;
2. Considers that all legislative and administrative
measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation
of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the
legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that
status;
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3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such
measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking
any further action which tends to change the status of
Jerusalem;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the




RESOLUTION 259 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 19 68 CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The Security Council
,
Concerned with the safety, welfare and security of the
inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation
by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967,
Recalling its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,
Noting the report by the Secretary-General, contained in
document S/8699, and appreciating his efforts in this
connexion,
Deploring the delay in the implementation of resolution
237 (1967) because of the conditions still being set by Israel
for receiving a Special Representative of the Secretary-
General
,
1. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch
a Special Representative to the Arab territories under mili-
tary occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June
1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237
(1967);
2. Requests the Government of Israel to receive the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to co-operate
with him and to facilitate his work;
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3. Recommends that the Secretary-General be afforded
all co-operation in his efforts to bring about the implemen-
tation of the present resolution and resolution 237 (1967).
Adopted at the 1454th meeting
by 12 votes to none, with 3
abstentions (Canada, Denmark,




RESOLUTION 2443 (XXIII) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 19 DECEMBER 1968 CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The General Assembly
,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,
Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of 12 August 1949, 5
Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right of everyone
to return to his own country and recalling Security Council
resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, General Assembly reso-
lutions 2252 (ES-'V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of
19 December 1967, Commission on Human Rights resolution 6
(XXIV) and Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV)
of 31 May 1968, in which these organs of the United Nations
called upon the Government of Israel, inter alia , to facili-
tate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the area
of military operations since the outbreak of hostilities,
Recalling the telegram dispatched by the Commission on
Human Rights on 8 March 1968, calling upon the Government of
15United Nations, Treaty Series , Vol. 75, No. 973, 1950.
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Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of
the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by Israel,
Recalling also Security Council resolution 259 (1968) of
27 September 1968, in which the Council expressed its concern
for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of
the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel, and
deplored the delay in the implementation of resolution 237
(1967)
,
Noting resolution I on respect for and implementation of
human rights in occupied territories, adopted by the Inter-
national Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968, in which
the Conference, inter alia :
(a) Expressed its grave concern for the violation of
human rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel;
(b) Drew the attention of the Government of Israel
to the grave consequences resulting from disregard of funda-
mental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories;
(c) Called upon the Government of Israel to desist
forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian
population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel and to respect
and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in occupied
territories;
(d) Affirmed the inalienable rights of all inhabi-
tants who have left their homes as a result of the outbreak
of hostilities in the Middle East to return, resume normal
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life, recover their property and homes, and rejoin their fami-
lies according to the provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,
1. Decides to establish a special committee of three
Member States to investigate Israeli practices affecting the
human rights of the population of the occupied territories;
2. Requests the President of the General Assembly to
appoint the members of the special committee;
3. Requests the Government of Israel to receive the
special committee, to co-operate with it and to facilitate
its work;
4. Requests the special- committee to report to the
Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need
arises thereafter;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the
special committee with all the necessary facilities for the
performance of its task.
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APPENDIX Q
RESOLUTION 26 7 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DATED 3 JULY 196 9 CONCERNING MEASURES TAKEN BY
ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM
The Security Council
,
Recalling its resolution 252 of 21 May 1968 and the
earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254
(ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively concerning measures
and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of
Jerusalem,
Having heard the statements of the parties concerned on
the question,
Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned
resolutions Israel has taken further measures tending to
change the status of the City of Jerusalem,
Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition
of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,
1. Reaffirms its resolution 252 (1968);
2. Deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard
for the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions
mentioned above;
3. Censures in the strongest terms all measures taken
to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;
4. Confirms that all legislative and administrative
measures and actions by Israel which purport to alter the
status of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and prop-
erties thereon are invalid and cannot change that status;
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5. Urgently calls once more upon Israel to rescind
forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change
the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain
from all actions likely to have such an effect;
6. Requests Israel to inform the Security Council with-
out any further delay of its intentions with regard to the
implementation of the provisions of this resolution;
7. Determines that, in the event of a negative response
or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall recon-
vene without delay to consider what further action should be
taken in this matter;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.
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APPENDIX R
RESOLUTION 271 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 19 69 CONCERNING ARSON AT
AL AQSA MOSQUE AND THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM
The Security Council
,
Grieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the
Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the
military occupation of Israel,
Mindful of the consequent loss of human culture,
Having heard the statements made before the Council
reflecting the universal outrage caused by the act of sac-
rilege in one of the most venerated shrines of mankind,
Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and
267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly
resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July
1967, respectively, concerning measures and actions by Israel
affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,
Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition
of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,
1. Reaffirms its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);
2. Recognizes that any act of destruction or profana-
tion of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in
Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such
act may seriously endanger international peace and security;
3. Determines that the execrable act of desecration and
profanation of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the
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immediate necessity of Israel's desisting from acting in vio-
lation of the aforesaid resolutions and rescinding forthwith
all measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the
status of Jerusalem;
4. Calls upon Israel scrupulously to observe the pro-
1
6
visions of the Geneva Conventions and international law
governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any
hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of
the Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem, including any coop-
eration that Council may desire from countries with predomi-
nantly Moslem population and from Moslem communities in
relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the
Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem;
5. Condemns the failure of Israel to comply with the
aforementioned resolutions and calls upon it to implement
forthwith the provisions of these resolutions;
6. Reiterates the determination in paragraph 7 of reso-
lution 267 (1969) that, in the event of a negative response
or no response, the Security Council shall convene without
delay to consider what further action should be taken in this
matter;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the
implementation of the present resolution and to report
1
6
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (United Nations,
Treaty Series , vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 970-973).
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thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible
date.
Adopted at the 1512th meeting
by 11 votes to none, with 4
abstentions (Colombia, Finland
,





RESOLUTION 253 5 (XXIV) B OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 10 DECEMBER 1969 AFFIRMING THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS
OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE
The General Assembly
,
Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refu-
gees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights
under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,
Gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has
been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment,
arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of homes and prop-
erty, deportation and other repressive acts against the refu-
gees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories,
Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of
14 June 1967,
Recalling also its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967
and its resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 calling
upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate
steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who
had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,
Desirous of giving effect to its resolutions for reliev-
the plight of the displaced persons and the refugees,
1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of
Palestine;
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2. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the
grave situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices
in the occupied territories and Israel's refusal to implement
the above resolutions;
3. Requests the Security Council to take effective
measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the







RESOLUTION 2546 (XXIV) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 11 DECEMBER 1969 CONCERNING VIOLATIONS BY ISRAEL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The General Assembly
,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations,
Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of 12 August 1949 and the provisions of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights,
Recalling the humanitarian resolutions regarding the
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
territories occupied by Israel, especially Security Council
resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of
27 September 1968, Commission on Human Rights resolutions 6
(XXIV) of 27 February 1968 and 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969, and
the relevant resolutions of the International Conference on
Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968, the Economic and Social
Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization and the World Health Organization,
Further recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July
1967 and 2443 (XXIII) and 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,
Concerned that the provisions of these resolutions have
not been implemented by the Israeli authorities,
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Gravely alarmed by fresh reports of collective punish-
ments, mass imprisonment, indiscriminate destruction of homes
and other acts of oppression against the civilian population
in the Arab territories occupied by Israel,
1. Reaffirms its resolutions relating to the violations
of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel;
2. Expresses its grave concern at the continuing
reports of violation of human rights in those territories;
3. Condemns such policies and practices as collective
and area punishment, the destruction of homes and the depor-
tation of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by
Israel;
4. Urgently calls upon the Government of Israel to
desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and
policies towards the civilian population in the occupied ter-
ritories and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the
various international organizations;
5. Requests the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the
Occupied Territories, established under General Assembly reso-







RESOLUTION 2628 (XXV) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1970 CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS
The General Assembly
,
Seriously concerned that the continuation of the present
grave and deteriorating situation in the Middle East consti-
tutes a serious threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting
from the threat or use of force shall be recognized,
Deploring the continued occupation of the Arab terri-
tories since 5 June 1967,
Seriously concerned that Security Council resolution 242
(1967) of 22 November 1967, which was unanimously adopted and
which provides for a peaceful settlement of the situation in
the Middle East, has not yet been implemented,
Having considered the item entitled "The situation in
the Middle East,"
1. Reaffirms that the acquisition of territories by
force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories
thus occupied must be restored;
2. Reaffirms that the establishment of a just and last-
ing peace in the Middle East should include the application
of both the following principles:
(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conflict;
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(b) Termination of all claims or states of bellig-
erency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of every
State in the area and its right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
3. Recognizes that respect for the rights of the Pales-
tinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of
a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
4. Urge s the speedy implementation of Security Council
resolution 242 (1967) , which provides for the peaceful settle-
ment of the situation in the jyiiddle East, in all its parts;
5. Calls upon the parties directly concerned to instruct
their representatives to resume contact with the Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General in order to enable him
to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for
the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all
its parts;
6. Recommends to the parties that they extend the cease-
fire for a period of three months in order that they may
enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Represen-
tative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect
to Security Council resolution 242 (1967)
;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council within a period of two months, and to the
General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the
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Special Representative and on the implementation of Security
Council resolution 242 (1967);
8. Requests the Security Council to consider, if neces-
sary, making arrangements, under the relevant Articles of the




RESOLUTION 2672 (XXV) C OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 8 DECEMBER 1970 CONCERNING EQUAL RIGHTS AND
SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PALESTINIANS
The General Assembly
,
Recognizing that the problem of the Palestinian Arab
Regugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable
rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,
Recalling its resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December
1969, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the
people of Palestine,
Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of
the Charter of the United Nations and more recently reaffirmed
in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled
to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations;
2. Declares that full respect for the inalienable rights
of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
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APPENDIX W
RESOLUTION 2727 (XXV) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DATED 15 DECEMBER 1970 CONCERNING VIOLATIONS BY ISRAEL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The General Assembly
,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations,
Bearing in mind the provisions of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the provisions of the Geneva Conven-
tion relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War of 12 August 1949,
Recalling Security Council Resolutions 237 (1967) of
14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968,
Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July
1967, 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2452 A (XXIII) of
19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and
2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970,
Further recalling Commission on Human Rights resolutions
6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968, 18 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969 19 and
10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970, 20 the telegram of 8 March 1968 to
17United Nations, Treaty Series , vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.
1
8
Official Records of the Economic and Social Council
,
Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475 ) , chapter XVIII
19 Ibid
.
, Forty-sixth Session , document E/4621,
chapter XVIII.
20 Ibid., Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 5 (E/4816 )
chapter XXIII.
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21the Israeli authorities, the relevant resolutions of the
International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in
221968, Commission on Status of Women resolution 7 (XXIII)
23
of 9 April 1970 and the relevant resolutions of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health
Organization,
Having considered the report of the Special Committee
to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights
of the Population of the Occupied Territories,
Noting with regret that the provisions of these reso-
lutions have not been implemented by the Israeli authorities,
Gravely concerned for the safety, welfare and security
of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military
occupation by Israel,
1. Expresses its sincere appreciation to the Special
Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the
Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories





, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475 )
,
para. 400.
22 See Final Act of the International Conference on Human
Rights (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 68. XIV. 2)
chapter III.
23Official Records of the Economic and Social Council ,
Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 6 (E/4831 ) , chapter XII.
24A/8089.
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2. Calls upon the Government of Israel to immediately
implement the recommendations of the Special Committee
25
embodied in its report, and to comply with its obligations
under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolu-
tions adopted by the various international organizations;
3. Requests the Special Committee, pending the early
termination of Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to
continue its work and to consult, as appropriate, with the
International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure
the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the
occupied territories;
4. Urges the Government of Israel to receive the Special
Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work;
5. Requests the Special Committee to report to the
Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need
arises thereafter;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Special
Committee with all the necessary facilities for the continued
performance of its tasks;
7. Decides to inscribe on the provisional agenda of its





the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices





RESOLUTION 298 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DATED 25 SEPTEMBER 1971 CONCERNING MEASURES TAKEN BY
ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM
The Security Council
,
Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) and
the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254
(ES-V) of July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel
designed to change the status of the Israeli-occupied section
of Jerusalem,
Having considered the letter of the Permanent Represen-
tative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/10313) and
the reports of the Secretary-General (S/8052, S/8146, S/9149
and Add.l, S/9537 and S/10124 and Add.l and 2), and having
heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,
Reaffirming the principle that acquisition of territory
by military conquest is inadmissible,
Noting with concern the non-compliance by Israel with
above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures
designed to change the status and character of the occupied
section of Jerusalem,
1. Reaffirms Security Council resolutions 252 (1968)
and 267 (1969)
;
2. Deplores the failure of Israel to respect the pre-
vious resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning
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measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the
status of the city of Jerusalem;
3. Confirms in the clearest possible terms that all
legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to
change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expro-
priation of land and properties, transfer of populations and
legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied sec-
tion are totally invalid and cannot change that status;
4. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all previous
measures and actions and to take no further steps in the
occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the
status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of
the inhabitants and the interests of the international com-
munity, or a just and lasting peace;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with
the President of the Security Council and using such instru-
mentalities as he "may choose, including a representative or
a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate




UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 33 8,
OCTOBER 21-22, 1973
The Security Council
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to
cease all firing and terminate all military activity immedi-
ately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption
of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately
after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council
Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the
cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned
under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and
durable peace in the Middle East.
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APPENDIX Z
JOINT U.S. -SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST,
NEW YORK, OCTOBER 1, 19 77
Having exchanged views regarding the unsafe situation
which remains in the Middle East, U.S. Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance and Member of the Politbureau of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. A. A. Gromyko have the following statement to make
on behalf of their countries, which are cochairmen of the
Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East:
1. Both governments are convinced that vital interests
of the peoples of this area, as well as the interests of
strengthening peace and international security in general,
urgently dictate the necessity of achieving, as soon as pos-
sible, a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating
all parties concerned and all questions.
The United States and the Soviet Union believe that,
within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the
Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement
should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal
of Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the 1967
conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, includ-
ing insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people;
termination of the state of war and establishment of normal
peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the
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principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and politi-
cal independence.
The two governments believe that, in addition to
such measures for insuring the security of the borders between
Israel and the neighboring Arab states as the establishment
of demilitarized zones and the agreed stationing in them of
U.N. troops or observers, international guarantees of such
borders as well as of the observance of the terms of the set-
tlement can also be established should the contracting parties
so desire. The United States and the Soviet Union are ready
to participate in these guarantees, subject to their consti-
tutional processes.
2. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that
the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental
solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its
entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva
peace conference, specially convened for these purposes, with
participation in its work of the representatives of all the
parties involved in the conflict including those of the Pales-
tinian people, and legal and contractual formalization of the
decisions reached at the conference.
In their capacity as cochairmen of the Geneva con-
ference, the United States and the U.S.S.R. affirm their
intention, through joint efforts and in their contacts with
the parties concerned, to facilitate in every way the resump-
tion of the work of the conference not later than December
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1977. The cochairmen note that there still exist several
questions of a procedural and organizational nature which
remain to be agreed upon by the participants to the conference
3. Guided by the goal of achieving a just political
settlement in the Middle East and of eliminating the explosive
situation in this area of the world, the United States and the
U.S.S.R. appeal to all parties in the conflict to understand
the necessity for careful consideration of each other's
legitimate rights and interests and to demonstrate mutual
readiness to act accordingly.
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APPENDIX AA
A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AGREED AT CAMP DAVID
DOCUMENTS AGREED TO AT CAMP DAVID,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1978
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic
of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met
with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America,
at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and
have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Mid-
dle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli con-
flict to adhere to it.
PREAMBLE
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided
by the following:
— The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the
conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts. (The
texts of Resolutions 242 and 338 are annexed to this document.)
— After four wars during thirty years, despite inten-
sive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of
civilization and the birthplace of three great religions,
does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the
Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural
resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace
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and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and
cooperation among nations.
— The historic initiative of President Sadat in visit-
ing Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Par-
liament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal
visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals
made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these
missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an
unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if
this generation and future generations are to be spared the
tragedies of war.
— The provisions of the. Charter of the United Nations
and the other accepted norms of international law and legiti-
macy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of rela-
tions among all states.
-- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations
between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace
and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carry-
ing out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242
and 338.
— Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and political independence of every state in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a
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new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by coop-
eration in promoting economic development, in maintaining
stability, and in assuring security.
— Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and
by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations.
In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties
can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security
arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments
areas, early warning stations, the presence of international
forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other
arrangements that they agree are useful.
FRAMEWORK
Taking these factors into account, the parties are
determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settle-
ment of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of
peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace
and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for
peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most
deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that
this framework as appropriate is intended by them to consti-
tute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but
also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is
prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With
that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as
follows:
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A. WEST BANK AND GAZA
1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the
Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the
resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.
To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West
Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a
peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into
account the security concerns of all the parties, there should
be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a
period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full
autonomy to the inhabitants, .under these arrangements the
Israeli military government and its civilian administration
will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has
been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to
replace the existing military government. To negotiate the
details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of
Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis
of this framework. These new arrangements should give due
consideration both to the principle of self-government by
the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate
security concerns of the parties involved.
(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the
modalities for establishing the elected self-governing
authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of
Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank
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and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The par-
ties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers
and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be
exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment
of the remaining Israeli forces into specified locations.
The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring
internal and external security and public order. A strong
local police force will be established, which may include
Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces
will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of con-
trol posts to assure the security of the borders.
(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative
council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaug-
urated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As
soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the
beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take
place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza
and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a
peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the
transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted
among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives
of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate
but related committees will be convened, one committee, con-
sisting of representatives of the four parties which will
negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and
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Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second
committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and repre-
sentatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representa-
tives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to
negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking
into account the agreement reached on the final status of the
West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all
the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Reso-
lution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other mat-
ters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the
security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations
must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people and their just requirements. In this way, the Pales-
tinians will participate in the determination of their own
future through:
1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the
representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank
and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West
Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end
of the transitional period.
2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected
representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank
and Gaza.
3) Providing for the elected representatives of the
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how
they shall govern themselves consistent with the pro-
visions of their agreement.
4) Participating as stated above in the work of the com-
mittee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and
Jordan.
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2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions
made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during
the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing
such security, a strong local police force will be constituted
by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will main-
tain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the
designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
3. During the transitional period, representatives of
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will
constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on
the modalities of admission o_f persons displaced from the
West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures
to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common
concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with
other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for
a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution
of the refugee problem.
B. EGYPT-ISRAEL
1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat
or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall
be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions
of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties
agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding
within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace
treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the
conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude
similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehen-
sive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of
a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace
negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the
modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their
obligations under the treaty.
C. ASSOCIATED PRINCIPLES
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provi-
sions described below should apply to peace treaties between
Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and
Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relation-
ships normal to states at peace with one another. To this
end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this
respect include:
(a) full recognition;
(b) abolishing economic boycotts;
(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the
citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the
protection of the due process of law.
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3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic
development in the context of final peace treaties, with the
objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, coopera-
tion and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual
settlement of all financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participate in
the talks on matters related to the modalities of the imple-
mentation of the agreements and working out the timetable for
the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested
to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions
shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security
Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties
and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be
requested to conform their policies and actions with the
undertakings contained in this Framework.
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:
A. Sadat




President of the United States
of America
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Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty
Between Egypt and Israel
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt
agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding
within three months of the signing of this framework a peace
treaty between them.
It is agreed that:
The site of the negotiations will be under a United
Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed
All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply
in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
Unless otherwise mutually- agreed, terms of the peace
treaty will be implemented between two and three years after
the peace treaty is signed.
The following matters are agreed between the parties:
(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to
the internationally recognized border between
Egypt and mandated Palestine;
(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the
Sinai;
(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near
El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh
for civilian purposes only, including possible
commercial use by all nations;
(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel
through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on
the basis of the Constantinople Convention of
1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran
and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways
to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-
suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
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(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai
and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and
peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.
STATIONING OF FORCES
A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of
Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying
approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and
the Suez Canal.
B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped
with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be
stationed within an area lying west of the international bor-
der and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to
4 km.
C. In the area within 3 km east of the international
border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to
exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions,
will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the
area not included above.
The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as
decided during the peace negotiations.
Early warning stations may exist to ensure compliance
with the terms of the agreement.
United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of
the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the
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Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border,
and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of pas-
sage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not
be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security
Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the
five permanent members.
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim
withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established
between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition,
including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; ter-
mination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free move-
ment of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens
by the due process of law.
INTERIM WITHDRAWAL
Between three months and nine months after the signing of
the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a
line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad,
the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual
agreement.
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:
A. Sadat




President of the United States
of America
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Letters Accompanying the Documents Agreed To
at Camp David, September 22, 1978
September 17, 1978
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after
my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parlia-
ment [the Knesset] to decide the following question:
If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty
between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are
agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the
Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai
areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned
settlers in those areas?"
The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely
free from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the
effect that although the coalition is being now supported by
70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I
believe, both on the Government and the Opposition benches




[The President, Camp David, Thurmont, Maryland]
September 22, 1978
Dear Mr. President:
I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime
Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the
issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the lat-
ter ' s decision.
In this connection, I understand from your letter that
Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai
according to a timetable within the period specified for the
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implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any




Enclosure: Letter from Prime Minister Begin




In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in
Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the
position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the
settlements:
1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai
according to a timetable within the period specified
for the implementation of the peace treaty.
2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its consti-
tutional institutions to this basic principle is
therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotia-
tions for concluding a peace treaty.
3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Frame-
work" shall be void and invalid.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
[His Excellency Jimmy Carter, President of the United States
September 22, 1978
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, des-
cribing how you intend to place the question of the future
of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its
decision.
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Enclosure: Letter from President Sadat
[His Excellency Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel]
September 17, 1978
Dear Mr. President:
I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab
Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem:
1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank.
Legal and historical Arab rights in the City must be
respected and restored.
2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.
3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are
entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights,
being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank.
4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly
Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard
to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to
alter the status of the City are null and void and
should be rescinded.
5. All peoples must have free access to the City and
enjoy the free exercise of worship and the right to
visit and transit to the holy places without distinc-
tion or discrimination.
6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the
administration and control of their representatives.
7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided
and a joint municipal council composed of an equal
number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the
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carrying out of these functions.
City shall be undivided.
Sincerely,
In this way, the
(signed)
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
[His Excellency Jimmy Carter, President of the United States]
17 September 1978
Dear Mr. President,
I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on
28 June 1967— Israel's Parliament [The Knesset] promulgated
and adopted a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered
by a decreee to apply the law, the jurisdiction and adminis-
tration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel [land of
Israel—Palestine], as stated in that decree."
On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed
in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capi-




[The President, Camp David, Thurmont, Maryland]
September 22, 1978
Dear Mr. President:
I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting
forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting
a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his
information.
The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains
as stated by Ambassador [Arthur] Goldberg in the United
Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently
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by Ambassador [Charles] Yost in the United Nations Security




[His Excellency Anwar el-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic
of Egypt, Cairo]
September 17, 19 78
Dear Mr. President:
In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle
East," I am writing you this letter to inform you of the posi-
tion of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the imple-
mentation of the comprehensive settlement.
To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to
the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legiti-
mate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared
to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, fol-




Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
[His Excellency Jimmy Carter, President of the United States.
The White House, Washington, D.C.]
September 22, 19 78
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:
A) In each paragraph of the agreed framework document the
expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are
being and will be construed and understood by you as
"Palestinian Arabs."
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B) In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank"
appears, it is being and will be, understood by the




[His Excellency Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel]
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APPENDIX BB
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE
WEST BANK AND THE PALESTINIANS,
SEPTEMBER 1, 19 8 2
Today has been a day that should make all of us proud.
It marked the end of the successful evacuation of the P.L.O.
from Beirut, Lebanon. This peaceful step could never have
been taken without the good offices of the United States and,
especially, the truly heroic work of a great American diplo-
mat, Ambassador Philip Habib. Thanks to his efforts, I am
happy to announce that the U.S. Marine contingent helping to
supervise the evacuation has accomplished its mission. Our
young men should be out of Lebanon within two weeks. They,
too, have served the cause of peace with distinction and we
can all be very proud of them.
But the situation in Lebanon is only part of the overall
problem of conflict in the Middle East. So, over the past
two weeks, while events in Beirut dominated the front page,
America was engaged in a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to
lay the groundwork for a broader peace in the region. For
once, there were no premature leaks as U.S. diplomatic mis-
sions traveled to Mideast capitals and I met here at home with
a wide range of experts to map out an American peace initia-
tive for the long-suffering peoples of the Middle East, Arab
and Israeli alike.
It seemed to me that, with the agreement in Lebanon, we
had an opportunity for a more far-reaching peace effort in
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the region and I was determined to seize that moment. In the
words of the scripture, the time had come to "follow after the
things which make for peace."
Tonight, I want to report to you on the steps we have
taken, and the prospects they can open up for a just and last-
ing peace in the Middle East.
America has long been committed to bringing peace to this
troubled region. For more than a generation, successive U.S.
administrations have endeavored to develop a fair and workable
process that could lead to a true and lasting Arab-Israeli
peace. Our involvement in the search for Mideast peace is
not a matter of preference, it is a moral imperative. The
strategic importance of the region to the United States is
well known.
But our policy is motivated by more than strategic inter-
ests. We also have an irreversible commitment to the survival
and territorial integrity of friendly states. Nor can we
ignore the fact that the well-being of much of the world's
economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East.
Finally, our traditional humanitarian concerns dictate a con-
tinuing effort to peacefully resolve conflicts.
When our Administration assumed office in January 1981,
I decided that the general framework for our Middle East




There were two basic issues we had to address. First,
there was the strategic threat to the region posed by the
Soviet Union and its surrogates, best demonstrated by the
brutal war in Afghanistan; and, second, the peace process
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. With regard to the
Soviet threat, we have strengthened our efforts to develop
with our friends and allies a joint policy to deter the Sovi-
ets and their surrogates from further expansion in the region,
and, if necessary, to defend against it. With respect to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, we have embraced the Camp David frame-
work as the only way to proceed. We have also recognized,
however, that solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, in and of
itself, cannot assure peace throughout a region as vast and
troubled as the Middle East.
Our first objective under the Camp David process was to
insure the successful fulfillment of the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty. This was achieved with the peaceful return of
the Sinai to Egypt in April 1982. To accomplish this, we
worked hard with our Egyptian and Israeli friends, and eventu-
ally with our friendly countries, to create the multinational
force which now operates in the Sinai.
Throughout this period of difficult and time-consuming
negotiations, we never lost sight of the next step of Camp
David, autonomy talks to pave the way for permitting the Pal-
estinian people to exercise their legitimate rights. However,
owing to the tragic assassination of President Sadat and other
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crises in the area, it was not until January 1982 that we
were able to make a major effort to renew these talks. Secre-
tary of State [Alexander] Haig and Ambassador [Richard] Fair-
banks made three visits to Israel and Egypt this year to
pursue the autonomy talks. Considerable progress was made in
developing the basic outline of an American approach which was
to be presented to Egypt and Israel after April.
The successful completion of Israel's withdrawal from
Sinai and the courage shown on this occasion by Prime Minister
Begin and President Mubarak in living up to their agreements
convinced me the time had come for a new American policy to
try to bridge the remaining differences between Egypt and
Israel on the autonomy process. So, in May, I called for
specific measures and a timetable for consultations with the
Governments of Egypt and Israel on the next steps in the
peace process. However, before this effort could be launched,
the conflict in Lebanon pre-empted our efforts. The autonomy
talks were basically put on hold while we sought to untangle
the parties in Lebanon and still the guns of war.
The Lebanon war, tragic as it was, has left us with a new
opportunity for Middle East peace. We must seize it now and
bring peace to this troubled area so vital to world stability
while there is still time. It was with this strong convic-
tion that over a month ago, before the present negotiations
in Beirut had been completed, I directed Secretary of State
[George] Shultz to again review our policy and to consult a
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wide range of outstanding Americans on the best ways to
strengthen chances for peace in the Middle East.
We have consulted with many of the officials who were
historically involved in the process, with members of the
Congress, and with individuals from the private sector, and
I have held extensive consultations with my own advisers on
the principles I will outline to you tonight.
The evacuation of the P.L.O. from Beirut is now complete.
And we can now help the Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn
country. We owe it to outselves, and to posterity, to move
quickly to build upon this achievement. A stable and revived
Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for peace in the region.
The people of Lebanon deserve the best efforts of the inter-
national community to turn the nightmares of the past several
years into a new dawn of hope.
But the opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not
begin and end in Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild, we must
also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between Arabs
and Israelis.
The war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but two
consequences are key to the peace process:
First, the military losses of the P.L.O. have not dimin-
ished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solu-
tion of their claims; and second, while Israel's military
successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces
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are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring
just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.
The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate
security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Pales-
tinians. And that answer can only come at the negotiating
table. Each party must recognize that the outcome must be
acceptable to all and that true peace will require compromises
by all.
So, tonight I am calling for a fresh start. This is the
moment for all those directly concerned to get involved--or
lend their support—to a workable basis for peace. The Camp
David agreement remains the foundation of our policy. Its
language provides all parties with the leeway they need for
successful negotiations.
I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which
she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace
requiring magnanimity, vision and courage.
I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their
own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recogni-
tion of Israel's right to a secure future.
And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of
Israel, and the reality that peace and justice are to be
gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.
In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the
United States has a special responsibility. No other nation
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is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict
on the basis of trust and reliability.
The time has come for a new realism on the part of all
the peoples of the Middle East. The State of Israel is an
accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within
the community of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has thus
far been recognized by too few countries, and has been denied
by every Arab state except Egypt. Israel exists; it has a
right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those
facts.
The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in
the region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut
dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian
people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more
than a question of refugees. I agree. The Camp David agree-
ment recognized that fact when it spoke of the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
For peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been
most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader
participation in the peace process, most immediately by Jordan
and by the Palestinians, will Israel be able to rest confident
in the knowledge that its security and integrity will be
respected by its neighbors. Only through the process of
negotiation can all the nations of the Middle East achieve a
secure peace.
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These then are our general goals. What are the specific
new American positions, and why are we taking them?
In the Camp David talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt
have felt free to express openly their views as to what the
outcome should be. Understandably, their views have differed
on many points.
The United States has thus far sought to play the role
of mediator. We have avoided public comment on the key
issues. We have always recognized, and continue to recognize,
that only the voluntary agreement of those parties most
directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring
solution. But it has become evident to me that some clearer
sense of America's position on the key issues is necessary to
encourage wider support for the peace process.
First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must
be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants
of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their
own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle
of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and
to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
The purpose of the five-year period of transition which
would begin after free elections for a self-governing Pales-
tinian authority is to prove to the Palestinians that they
can run their own affairs, and that such Palestinian autonomy
poses no threat to Israel's security.
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The United States will not support the use of any addi-
tional land for the purpose of settlements during the transi-
tion period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement
freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create
the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks.
Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the
security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the
Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.
I want to make the American position clearly understood:
The purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and
orderly transfer of domestic authority from Israel to the
Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the
same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's
security requirements.
Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of
the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot
be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian
state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis
of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank
and Gaza.
So the United States will not support the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza,
and we will not support annexation or permanent control by
Israel.
There is, however, another way to peace. The final status
of these lands must, of course, be reached through the
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give-and-take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of
the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of
the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the
best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.
We base our approach squarely on the principle that the
Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations
involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange
is enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,
which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp
David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid
as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort.
It is the United States' position that— in turn for
peace— the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to
all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.
When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel,
our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to
give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of
true peace and normalization and the security arrangements
offered in return.
Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain
undivided, but its final status should be decided through
negotiations.
In the course of negotiations to come, the United States
will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable
compromises, and likely to promote a sound agreement. We
will also put forward our own detailed proposals when we
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believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United
States will oppose any proposal— from any party and at any
point in the negotiating process—that threatens the security
of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is
ironclad.
During the past few days, our Ambassadors in Israel,
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host
government the proposals in full detail that I have outlined
here tonight.
I am convinced that these proposals can bring justice,
bring security and bring durability to an Arab-Israeli peace.
The United States will stand by these principles with
total dedication. They are fully consistent with Israel's
security requirements and the aspirations of the Palestinians.
We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace table
as envisaged by the Camp David accords. And I fervently hope
that the Palestinians and Jordan, with the support of their
Arab colleagues, will accept this opportunity.
Tragic turmoil in the Middle East runs back to the dawn
of history. In our modern day, conflict after conflict has
taken its brutal toll there. In an age of nuclear challenge
and economic interdependence, such conflicts are a threat to
all the people of the world, not just the Middle East itself.
It is time for us all, in the Middle East and around the
world, to call a halt to conflict, hatred and prejudice: it
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is time for us all to launch a common effort for reconstruc-
tion, peace and progress.
It has often been said—and regrettably too often been
true—that the story of the search for peace and justice in
the Middle East is a tragedy of opportunities missed.
In the aftermath of the settlement in Lebanon we now face
an opportunity for a broader peace. This time we must not
let it slip from our grasp. We must look beyond the diffi-
culties and obstacles of the present and move with fairness
and resolve toward a brighter future. We owe it to ourselves,
and to posterity, to do no less. For if we miss this chance
to make a fresh start, we may look back on this moment from
some later vantage point and realize how much that failure
cost us all.
These, then, are the principles upon which American policy
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict will be based. I have made
a personal commitment to see that they endure and, God wil-
ling, that they will come to be seen by all reasonable, com-
passionate people as fair, achievable, and in the interests
of all who wish to see peace in the Middle East.
Tonight, on the eve of what can be a dawning of new hope
for the people of the troubled Middle East--and for all the
world's people who dream of a just and peaceful future— I ask
you, my fellow Americans, for your support and your prayers
in this great undertaking.
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APPENDIX CC
EXCERPT FROM THE ARAB LEAGUE [FEZ] DECLARATION,
SEPTEMBER 9, 19 82
Following is the portion of the Arab League declaration,
issued on September 9, dealing with the resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. The declaration also dealt with Leba-
non, the Persian Gulf war, and the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict:
The summit paid homage to the resistance of the forces of
the Palestine revolution, the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples
and the Syrian Arab armed forces, and reaffirmed its support
to the Palestinian people in the struggle to recover its
inalienable national rights.
The summit, convinced of the power of the Arab nation to
achieve its legitimate objectives and put an end to the
aggression on the basis of the fundamental principles laid
down by the Arab summits and in view of the desire of the
Arab countries to pursue action by every means for the
achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, taking account
of the plan of His Excellency President Habib Bourguiba which
considers international legality to be the basis for the solu-
tion of the Palestinian question, and of the plan of His
Majesty King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz concerning peace in the
Middle East, and in the light of discussions and observations
made by their majesties, excellencies and highnesses, the




The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occu-
pied in 1967 including Arab Al Qods [Jerusalem]
.
[2]
The dismantling of settlements established by Israel on
the Arab territories after 1967.
[3]
The guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of reli-
gious rites for all religions in the holy shrines.
[4]
The reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to
self-determination and the exercise of its imprescriptible
and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole and legitimate
representative, and the indemnification of all those who do
not desire to return.
[5]
Placing the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the control of
the United Nations for a transitory period not exceeding a
few months.
[6]
The establishment of an independent Palestinian state
with Al Qods as its capital.
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[7]
The Security Council guarantees peace among all states of
the region including the independent Palestinian state.
[8]
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